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DOES REGULATION CHILL
DEMOCRATIC DELIBERATION?
THE CASE OF GMOS
AuSON PECKt

Breakthroughs in science and technology pose a challenge to the
U.S. legal system: either regulate under pre-existing laws using a business-as-usual approach, or pass new laws to deal with new relationships and conflicts created by these breakthroughs.How does the legal
process determine when to regulate and when to legislate? Does that
process adequately ensure deliberative democratic debate and implementation of democratic consensus? Does it adequately protect urgent
interests in the meantime? Currently, this determination is ongoing
with regard to new scientific developments such as climate change science, and new technological developments such as hydraulic fracturing
of unconventional naturalgas shales. To examine this type of legislation/regulationdecision, this Article focuses on an older example: the
creation of the regulatory structure for genetically-modified organisms
("GMOs") in the 1980s and 1990s. The evidence explored in this case
study suggests that deliberative asymmetries between the political
branches, not public consensus behind a regulatory solution, led to
both the creation and the persistence of a regulatory framework for
GMOs under existing laws. The Article raises questions for contemporary regulation/ legislation debates and lays a foundation for discussion of potential legal reforms.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Breakthroughs in science or technology often raise the question of
whether new law is needed, or whether regulation under old law is
sufficient. Frequently, the public debates and Congress wait while
agencies regulate by analogy under pre-existing statutes. Does it matter? Can Congress simply undo through legislation any early agency
rulemaking based on existing statutes if the public demands it? In
other words, does the present structure of government afford the citit Associate Professor of Law, West Virginia University College of Law. The author would like to thank Bret Birdsong, Donna Byrne, Anne Lofaso, Alexia Brunet
Marks, Margaret McCabe, Emily Whalen Parento, Michael Roberts, Sean Tu, and
James Van Nostrand for comments on earlier drafts of this Article. C. Ryan Hupp provided outstanding research assistance and lively scholarly debate. This article was prepared with the support of the West Virginia University College of Law and the Bloom
Junior Faculty Summer Research Grant.
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zenry a constitutionally adequate opportunity to reach democratic
consensus on whether new science and technology require new laws?
This challenge is often presented with urgency. Representatives
of the new industry are eager to employ the new science to improve
the world and to beat the competition to the market. Skeptics credibly
challenge that the infant technology has not yet resolved or even identified all potential new risks and urge precautionary regulation in the
meantime. The urgency of these interests often leads federal agencies
to regulate based on their authority under statutes that pre-dated the
new technology. In some respects, such interpretation of existing statutory authority is the sina qua non of agency power; Congress drafts
laws broadly so the laws may be applied to emerging situations. But
inevitably some scientific or technological developments will be gamechangers-breakthroughs that so defy analogy to previous circumstances that pre-existing laws cannot be said to represent a real democratic consensus on the best legal framework for the new relationships
and conflicts created.
Which technologies are game-changers? That question is, and
must be, subject to debate, and a citizen's opinion of the appropriateness of agency action without new statutory authority may turn on the
answer. If the lawmaking process provides an adequate mechanism
for democratic deliberation and for implementation of any consensus
that new law is needed, then regulation that merely protects interests
in the interim is unproblematic from a separation of powers perspective. If, however, the existence of regulation under old law somehow
curtails or interferes with the democratic process of arriving at or implementing democratic consensus, such regulatory action would undermine the democratic values that separation of powers was
intended to protect. On the other hand, to tie the hands of regulators
or to put a freeze on industry while the citizenry engages in the oftenextended process of arriving at democratic consensus could jeopardize
important social goals including environmental and human health
protection, industry competitiveness, and advancement of knowledge.
The dilemma is hardly new. From steam engines to stem cells,
U.S. law has long been engaged in adapting to newly-emerging science
and technology. Recently, the Obama Administration has aggressively pursued agency action to protect what the President and his
Cabinet view as threats to human and environmental health from developments like hydraulic fracturing of unconventional shale gas and
large-scale industrial emissions of greenhouse gases.' Legal scholars
1. See, e.g., Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse
Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009)
(concluding that motor vehicle emissions of six greenhouse gases endanger public
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and political scientists have widely discussed the relative agility of the
executive branch in policy-setting, in contrast to the collective action
problems of the legislative branch. 2 This agility may be viewed as an
advantage with regard to new science and technology, which often
raise urgent concerns ranging from environmental protection to business competitiveness. But the noted agility of the regulatory process
may have adverse democratic consequences if regulatory action happens before public consensus can form about proper legal controls. The
danger is greater in the case of path-breaking new science and technology than in the typical instance of federal regulation under old
statutes. Such path-breaking technologies and advances in science do
not immediately enter the public consciousness or become familiar
subjects of relationships and disputes for the average citizen. This Article aims to explore a critical question raised by these cases of pathbreaking technology and scientific knowledge that strain analogy
under pre-existing statutes: does creating a regulatory framework
under pre-existing statutes at the early stage of public awareness of
the technology have a "chilling effect" on public deliberation about
whether new legislation is necessary or desirable?
Opponents of hydraulic fracturing and supporters of greenhouse
gas ("GHG") controls may favor aggressive administrative action now,
but the democratic consequences of this executive branch policy-making advantage may seem less appealing when considered in other contexts. A review of the legislative and regulatory actions regarding
genetically-modified organisms ("GMOs") in the 1980S3 -and the conhealth and welfare); Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards; Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324 (May 7, 2010)
(setting greenhouse gas emissions standards for cars and light trucks under Clean Air
Act); Letter from EPA Asst. Admin. Steven A. Owners to Deborah Goldberg, Earthjustice (Nov. 23, 2011), available at http://www.epa.gov/oppt/chemtest/pubs/EPA-Letter-toEarthjustice-on-TSCA-Petition.pdf (partially granting Earthjustice request for
rulemaking regarding disclosure of hydraulic fracturing fluid content).
2.

See, e.g., Terry M. Moe & William G. Howell, The PresidentialPower of Unilat-

eral Action, 15 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 132 (1999) (suggesting constitutional ambiguity as
basis of presidential power to make law unilaterally); Aaron J. Saiger, Obama's "Czars"
for Domestic Policy and the Law of the White House Staff, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2577
(2011) (examining the consolidation of administrative power in the White House and
the ability of policymaking "czars" to operate outside the formal structure of the Administrative Procedures Act); Keith E. Whittington & Daniel P. Carpenter, Executive Power
in American InstitutionalDevelopment, 1 PERSP. ON POL. 495 (2003) (rejecting narrative

of legislative dominance through case studies of executive political leadership, policy
innovation, and shaping of policy agenda). But see Kevin M. Stack, The President'sStatutory Powers to Administer the Laws, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 263 (2006) (offering criticism

of the presidential power theory by arguing that powers granted to executive officers do
not extend to the President for deference purposes absent an express grant of such
power to the President by Congress).
3. The terms "genetically modified organism" or "GMO" actually describe products that have been genetically modified by any method, including traditional breeding

656

CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

sequences of those actions for deliberative democracy about the technology in the decades since-may shed a more cautionary light on the
aggressive pursuit of regulatory action to deal with emerging science
and technology. This Article studies the case of regulation of GMOs to
evaluate one historical choice to regulate in the short term to protect
critical interests while a debate over the need for new legislation was
beginning. In the 1980s, the Reagan and Bush (I) Administrations
directed various federal agencies to regulate under existing laws, and
Congress introduced but failed to pass legislation specific to the newly
marketable technology. 4 Twenty-five years later, concerns about
GMOs and GMO regulation persist, and scientists have begun to identify unintended environmental and health consequences related to the
use of GMOs. 5 Still, the regulatory framework remains largely unchanged since its birth in the mid-1980s.
Although a vocal group of opponents to GMOs has generated public protests, court cases, and regulatory reviews, 6 research shows that
most Americans have engaged in few or no discussions about GMOs. 7
After a flurry of investigation in the 1980s, Congress has shown little
interest in modifying the agencies' existing statutory authority. And
recent events in biotech regulation reveal gaps in agency authority
under the old statutes,8 raising the question whether a sufficient
mechanism exists to spark congressional review and public deliberation to address such gaps as they emerge. This Article examines the
give-and-take between the agencies, the public, the courts, and Congress in an effort to gauge the level of democratic participation (or
even acquiescence) in the creation and persistence of the choice to regulate biotechnology under laws that predate the technology.
This case study is intended to lay a foundation for future studies
of the legislation/regulation dynamic with regard to now-emerging scientific and technological developments like climate change science
and hydraulic fracturing of unconventional shales. From these case
studies, both contemporary and retrospective, conclusions and recommendations may be drawn about necessary adjustments to the legislation/regulation decision-making process. Any such adjustments
should aim to ensure robust democratic participation and implementation of democratic consensus, while also protecting urgent interests
methods as well as modern biotechnology. According to conventional practice, however,
this article uses the term "GMO" interchangeably with "genetically-engineered organism" to refer to products altered by means of biotechnology.
4. See infra notes 102-153 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 193-232 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 233-243 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 175-185 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 19-22, 139-153 and accompanying text.
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such as market participation and health and environmental protection in the face of emerging science and technology. Part II sets up the
stakes of the debate by reviewing an important but little-noticed event
in biotechnology regulation in 2011. Part III places the GMO case
study in context of the debate over administrative legitimacy and deliberative democracy. Part IV examines in detail the choice between
regulation and legislation of GMOs in the 1980s. Part V examines
developments in the GMO debate between the mid-1980s and today,
asking whether the persistence of the regulatory framework reflects
democratic consensus around that approach. Finally, Part VI reflects
on the lessons learned and questions drawn from this history, and
suggests approaches to examination of contemporary legislation/regulation dilemmas and potential political reforms.
II.

ON BIOLISTICS, BLUEGRASS, AND GAPS IN THE GMO
FRAMEWORK

The stakes of the regulation-versus-legislation debate for deliberative democracy may be illustrated by a contemporary example. This
example raises questions about how effectively a regulatory solution
to emerging technology-a solution based on legislation that was
drafted and passed before contemplation of the new developmentscan be adapted to fit that new technology. Where the new technology
and the relationships or conflicts created by it are difficult to analogize
to more familiar situations, a further question arises whether the existence of an imperfect-fit regulatory structure has any impact on the
potential for democratic development of a more tailored regime based
on new legislation. In other words, does early regulation under existing statutes have a chilling effect on the deliberative process that
might eventually result in new legislation specific to the emerging
technology?
In September 2010, Scotts Miracle-Gro Co. ("Scotts") wrote to federal regulators about its new strain of Kentucky bluegrass, which had
been modified by biotechnology to be resistant to the herbicide
Roundup. Rather than using bacteria or viruses to insert the new
genes, as the first generation of biotechnology products had done,
Scotts's product was created through the use of biolistics, 9 or a "gene
gun," that shoots microparticles of heavy metals coated with DNA and
9. See Letter from Dr. Richard Shank, Senior Vice President, The Scotts MiracleGro Company, to Tom Vilsack, Secretary, United States Department of Agriculture
(Sept. 13, 2010), available at http://www.aphis.usda.gov/brs/aphisdocs/scotts-kbg.pdf
("Transformation of Kentucky bluegrass is stably integrated using purified trait DNA
transferred by biolistics.").
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RNA into cells to transfer the genetic traits.10 Scotts sought assurances that its product was not subject to the federal laws and regulations that govern new varieties of biotech plants."
The statute Congress utilized to delegate to the United States Department of Agriculture's ("USDA") Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service ("APHIS") the authority to regulate plants with genetic
modifications was the Federal Plant Pest Act of 1957,12 which was
later consolidated with other plant protection laws by the Plant Protection Act of 200013 ("PPA"). Under this statute, APHIS exercises
jurisdiction over "plant pests," defined as anything that could injure,
damage, or cause disease in plants, including bacteria and viruses.14
Consistent with the policy recommendations of the executive
branch,' 5 APHIS interpreted its jurisdiction over plant pests to extend
to the bacteria and viruses used to transfer new genetic traits into
plants.' 6 Since the bacteria or virus remained in the genetically modified organisms ("GMOs"), the PPA gave APHIS regulatory oversight
over most GMO plants at that time and for many years afterward.' 7
On the Friday before the Fourth of July weekend in 2011, APHIS
sent a letter to Scotts confirming that APHIS had no authority under
federal law to regulate Scotts's new herbicide-resistant Kentucky
bluegrass.' 8 The USDA determined that Scotts's herbicide-resistant
bluegrass did not fall within the terms of APHIS's regulatory jurisdiction over GMOs under the PPA because the new traits were transferred by the gene gun instead of by microbes. Based on that letter,
10. See Paul Voosen, Biotech: In Major Shift, USDA Clears Way for Modified Bluegrass, GREENWIRE (July 6, 2011) www.eenews.net/public/Greenwire/2011/07/06/3.

11. See Letter from Dr. Richard Shank to Tom Vilsack, supra note 10.
12. See Pub. L. No. 85-36, 71 Stat. 31 (1957) (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 150aa-150jj),
reorganized by Plant Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-224, 114 Stat. 438 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.).
13. Pub. L. No. 106-224, 114 Stat. 438 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
7 U.S.C.).
14. 7 U.S.C. § 7702 (2012). The Plant Protection Act defines a "plant pest" as "any
living stage of any of the following that can directly or indirectly injure, cause damage
to, or cause disease in any plant or plant product: (A) A protozoan. (B) A nonhuman
animal. (C) A parasitic plant. (D) A bacterium. (E) A fungus. (F) A virus or viroid. (G) An
infectious agent or other pathogen. (H) Any article similar to or allied with any of the
articles specified in the preceding subparagraphs." Id.
15. See Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg.
23,302 (June 26, 1986) [hereinafter 1986 Coordinated Framework].
16. See Introduction of Organisms and Products Altered or Produced Through Genetic Engineering Which Are Plant Pests or Which There Is Reason to Believe Are Plant
Pests, 52 Fed. Reg. 22,892, 22,908 (June 16, 1987) [hereinafter Introduction of Plant
Pests].
17.

Id.

18. Letter from Michael C. Gregoire, Deputy Adm'r, Animal & Plant Health Inspection Serv., to Dr. Richard Shank, Senior Vice President, The Scotts Miracle-Gro Co.
(July 1, 2011), available at http://www.aphis.usda.gov/brs/aphisdocs/scotts-kbg-resp.
pdf.
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Scotts was free to develop, produce and sell its genetically-modified
Kentucky bluegrass with no oversight from regulators.
Is the public aware that a new class of biotech plants is not subject to federal controls? The USDA opinion letter acknowledging the
gap in authority was published late on a Friday before a holiday weekend. Media coverage of the decision was not extensive.' 9 Anecdotally,
during a presentation to agricultural law professors in January 2012,
not one member of the audience had heard about the Kentucky bluegrass decision. 20 If even agricultural law experts are unaware of gaps
in legislative authority that leave a new generation of biotechnology
products unregulated, are such legislative gaps receiving sufficient attention by the public and by Congress? Did the regulatory structure
created under the pre-existing laws include a mechanism for requesting additional legislative authority when such gaps became apparent?
Has Congress been alerted to those gaps? Do citizens have adequate
opportunity to debate and arrive at consensus on whether new law
may be needed or appropriate? Does the existence of an imperfect regulatory structure based on pre-existing statutes chill debate over the
potential creation of a legislative solution that would fill the gaps?
APHIS's decision that it lacked authority to regulate a new class
of biotechnology products was described by news accounts as a "major
shift"2 1 that "punched through U.S. biotech regs."2 2 More accurately,
the "shift" was consistent with existing biotech laws and regulations.
Rather than changing the law, the USDA's decision shone light on a
19. See Jerry Hagstrom, USDA Rules on GE Bluegrass, AGwEEK, July 19, 2011 at
36; Robert Johnson, This Genetically Modified Grass May Lead To a New Generationof
Superweed, Bus. INSIDER, July 12, 2011; Andrew Pollack, U.S.D.A. Ruling on Bluegrass
Stirs Cries of Lax Regulation, N.Y. TIMEs, July 7, 2011, at B2; U.S. Won't Regulate Modified Grass, CALGARY HERALD, July 4, 2011, at B3; Paul Voosen, How Unwitting Kiwis,
and Their Petunias, Punched Through U.S. Biotech Regs, N.Y. TIMEs, July 15, 2011;

Voosen, supra note 10. Several news sources noted the low profile that the USDA gave
the announcement. See Hagstrom, supra (describing "little noticed July 1 news release"); Johnson, supra (describing how a "significant" USDA announcement "slipped"
to the public "when most people were looking to the long weekend rather than the
news"); Voosen, supra (noting decision released "on the Friday before the Fourth of July
weekend"). Several news sources noted the low profile that USDA gave the announcement. See Hagstrom, supra (describing "little noticed July 1 news release"); Johnson,
supra (describing how a "significant" USDA announcement "slipped" to the public
"when most people were looking to the long weekend rather than the news"); Voosen,
supra note 10 (noting decision released "on the Friday before the Fourth of July
weekend").
20. Alison Peck, Address at a Meeting of the Section on Agricultural Law, Association of American Law Schools (Jan. 7, 2012).
21. Voosen, supra note 10.
22. Voosen, supra note 10. Even among agricultural law experts, few heard about
the decision. When the author presented this development to a group of agricultural
law scholars in January 2012, no member of the audience had heard of the events.
Peck, supra note 20.
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place where no law existed at all. By basing GMO regulation on the
PPA's grant of authority to USDA to regulate plant pests, the executive branch left a gap in the regulatory framework for any new biotechnology that did not rely on bacteria or viral vectors.
In a 1986 statement entitled the Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology ("1986 Coordinated Framework"), the White
House Office of Science and Technology Policy ("OSTP") divided regulatory authority for agricultural biotechnology among three federal
agencies: the USDA, which regulates the testing and commercialization of new agricultural biotech products; the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA"), which regulates the introduction and marketing of
foods created through the use of genetic engineering; and the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"), which regulates genetically-altered microorganisms and pesticide properties of geneticallyengineered plant varieties. 23 Each of these agencies regulates under
statutes that pre-date commercial agricultural biotechnology. The
FDA's authority is based primarily on the Federal Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act,2 4 a 1938 act that includes authorization for the FDA to
ensure food safety through regulation of food additives and misbranding.2 5 The USDA's authority stems primarily from a law that dates
back to the Federal Plant Pest Act of 1957, reorganized in the PPA,
which gave the USDA jurisdiction over bacteria and viruses. 2 6 The
EPA derives its authority from the relatively modern pesticide and
toxics control laws of the 1970s, including the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide and Rodenticide Act 2 7 ("FIFRA") and the Toxic Substances
Control Act 2 8 ("TSCA"). 29
This tripartite regulatory structure resulted from White House
policy directives during the 1980s and early 1990s, at the advent of
23. See 1986 Coordinated Framework, supra note 15, at 23,302; see also Proposal
for a Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 49 Fed. Reg. 50,856 (Dec.
31, 1984) [hereinafter Proposed Coordinated Framework].
24. Ch. 675, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as amended 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399f
(2012)).
25. See 21 U.S.C. H§321(s) (defining "food additive"), 321(n) (defining "misbranding"), 331 (prohibiting introduction of adulterated or misbranded foods), 371-72 (providing for regulatory and enforcement authority by FDA).
26.

See generally 7 U.S.C.

§§

7701-7786 (2012).

27. Ch. 125, 61 Stat. 163 (1947) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y
(2012)). Congress originally enacted FIFRA in 1947; the act was rewritten in 1972. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), U.S. ENVrL. PROTECTION
AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/oecaagct/ifra.html (last updated June 27, 2012).
28. Pub. L. No. 94-469, 90 Stat. 2003 (1976) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. (2012)).
29. See Statement of Policy; Microbial Products Subject to the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act and the Toxic Substances Control Act, 51 Fed. Reg.
23,313 (June 26, 1986) (providing the EPA policy statement for exercising authority
under FIFRA and TSCA).
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commercialization of biotech products.3 0 In the 1986 Coordinated
Framework, the OSTP acknowledged concerns over whether pre-existing laws were adequate to address the new technology, and whether
review mechanisms for new products were sufficient.3 1 The OSTP acknowledged that the Reagan Administration believed it had the responsibility to respond to these questions. 3 2 The OSTP concluded
that, for the most part, existing laws "would address regulatory needs
adequately."3 3 The OSTP directed the FDA, the USDA, and the EPA
to establish oversight mechanisms for the new biotech products based
on the existing statutes. In part, its decision was justified based on
the urgency of the issue and the relative speed of the regulatory process. The OSTP concluded, "The existing health and safety laws had
the advantage that they could provide more immediate regulatory protection and certainty for the industry than possible with the implementation of new legislation." 34
The 1986 Coordinated Framework was buttressed by a 1992 "Final Statement on Scope" published by the OSTP.3 5 The Final Statement on Scope reiterated the division of regulatory authority
announced in the 1986 Coordinated Framework and "sets forth the
proper basis for agencies' exercise of oversight authority within the
scope of discretion afforded by statute."3 6 The Final Statement on
Scope articulated principles to guide agency discretion, such as the
statement that "federal agencies shall exercise oversight of planned
introductions of biotechnology products into the environment only
upon evidence that the risk posed by the introduction is unreasonable"; that is, where the value of the risk-reduction measure outweighs
the cost of the measure.3 7
Based on the direction of the OSTP in the 1986 Coordinated
Framework and the Final Statement on Scope, the FDA, the EPA, and
the USDA proceeded to articulate policy statements and regulations
30. 1986 Coordinated Framework, supra note 15, at 23,302; Proposed Coordinated
Framework, supra note 23, at 50,856.
31. See 1986 Coordinated Framework, supra note 15, at 23,302 ("The underlying
policy question was whether the regulatory framework that pertained to products developed by traditional genetic manipulation techniques was adequate for products obtained with the new techniques.").
32. Id.
33. Id. at 23,303.
34. Id.
35. See Exercise of Federal Oversight Within Scope of Statutory Authority:
Planned Introductions of Biotechnology Products Into the Environment, 57 Fed. Reg.
6,753, 6,756 (Feb. 27, 1992) [hereinafter 1992 Final Statement on Scope]; see also Principles for Federal Oversight of Biotechnology: Planned Introduction Into the Environment of Organisms With Modified Hereditary Traits, 55 Fed. Reg. 31,118 (July 31,
1990) [hereinafter Proposed Statement of Scope].
36. 1992 Final Statement on Scope, supra note 35, at 6,753.
37. Id. at 6,756.
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in the late 1980s and into the 1990s. 3 3 These policies and regulations,
with some more recent amendments, 3 9 still control biotechnology
oversight today.
III. SEPARATION OF POWERS: BROAD DELEGATION OR NO
DELEGATION?
The question of whether and how agencies may regulate emerging
science and technology sheds important light on the broader debate
over the scope of executive regulatory power. Before the proliferation
of the administrative state, the lawmaking function was simply presumed to reside in the legislature, and early justifications of agency
action relied primarily on the analogy of a "transmission belt,"4 0 shuttling authority from the legislature making the laws to the agencies
enforcing them. 4 1 Later justifications focused instead on the technical
expertise of agencies to fill in the details of the laws, 4 2 and then on the
rights given to allow a broad array of interest groups to influence
agency decision-making.4 3 Eventually another theory emerged, the
38. See, e.g., Introduction of Plant Pests, supra note 16; Genetically Engineered
Organisms and Products; Notification Procedures for the Introduction of Certain Regulated Articles; and Petition for Nonregulated Status, 57 Fed. Reg. 53,036 (Nov. 6, 1992)
[hereinafter USDA - Genetically Engineered Organisms and Products]; Statement of
Policy: Foods Derived From New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. 22,984 (May 29, 1992)
[hereinafter FDA - Statement of Policy]; Proposed Policy; Plant-Pesticides Subject to
the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act and the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act, 59 Fed. Reg. 60,496 (Nov. 23, 1994) [EPA - Proposed Policy].
39. See, e.g., Premarket Notice Concerning Bioengineered Foods, 66 Fed. Reg.
4,706 (Jan. 18, 2001); Genetically Engineered Organisms and Products; Simplification
of Requirements and Procedures for Genetically Engineered Organisms, 62 Fed. Reg.
23,945 (May 2, 1997).
40. See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88
HARv. L. REV. 1669, 1675 (1975); see also Steven P. Crowley, Theories of Regulation:
Incorporatingthe Administrative Process, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 99 (1998).
41. See Emily Hammond Meazell, Presidential Control, Expertise, and the Defer-

ence Dilemma, 61 DUKE L.J. 1763, 1771-74 (2012) (arguing that when disputes arise
between executive and independent agencies, courts should give deference to those actions that are more closely aligned with statutory language and congressional intent);
see also Mark Fenster, The Birth of a "Logical System": Thurman Arnold and the Making of Modern Administrative Law, 84 OR. L. REV. 69, 76 (2005) (analyzing the role of

judicial review in both limiting and legitimizing the administrative state as it shifts
from a model of broad agency discretion to a reliance on technical expertise). See generally, Harold H. Bruff, PresidentialPower Meets Bureaucratic Expertise, 12 U. PA. J.
CONsT. L. 461 (2010).

42. See Fenster,supra note 41, at 76 (analyzing the role of judicial review in both
limiting and legitimizing the administrative state as it shifts from a model of broad
agency discretion to a reliance on technical expertise); Meazell, supra note 41, at 177174.
43. See, e.g., MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND
THE THEORY OF Gaoups 31-85 (1965); Steven P. Crowley, Public Interested Regulation,
28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 7, 9 (2000) (discussing the various divisions of interest group
theory while advocating a neopluralist model); Reuel E.Schiller, Enlargingthe Adminis-

trative Polity: Administrative Law and the Changing Definition of Pluralism, 1945-
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presidential control model, in which the power of agencies was justified by agencies' relationships with the President and the electoral accountability of that office. 4 4 In 2001, then visiting professor at
Harvard Law School Elena Kagan announced, "We live today in an
era of presidential administration," 4 5 and the presidential or political
control theory is now widely viewed as the dominant theory of agency
legitimacy. 4 6 The Obama Administration has taken a proactive role
in setting policy through agency action since the stalemate in Congress after the 2010 elections, brandishing the slogan "We Can't
Wait."47
While a more attenuated link between legislative action and regulatory power may be tolerated under these new theories that seek to
explain and defend the modern administrative state, most scholars
nevertheless assume some continued connection, however permissive,
between congressional delegation and agency action. Even the most
expansive theories of agency legitimacy must somehow explain how
the constitutional separation of powers between legislature and executive is preserved. 48
On the question of legitimacy of agency action, the easiest cases
occur at the margins: when an executive action would directly contra1970, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1389, 1396-98 (2000) (chronicling the rise and fall of interest
group pluralism and the shifting role of the judiciary in controlling the administrative
state).
44. See Lisa Shultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 485-92 (2003); William P. Marshall, Eleven Reasons Why PresidentialPower Inevitably Expands and Why It Matters,

88 B.U. L. REV. 505, 515 (2008); Meazell, supra note 42, at 1774-77; see also Jeffery E.

Shuren, The Modern Regulatory State: A Response to Changing Circumstances, 38
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 291, 295 (2001). But see Mariano-Florentino Cuellar, Auditing Executive Discretion, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 227, 230-32 (2006) (arguing that inadequate

oversight of executive agencies could be cured by the creation of an auditing agency).
45. Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARv. L. REV. 2245, 2246
(2001).
46. See Glen Staszewski, PoliticalReasons, Deliberative Democracy, and Administrative Law, 97 IOWA L. REV. 849, 851 (2012); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrarinessand Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461,

485-92 (2003); see also Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.

837, 842-43 (1984) (holding that agencies could "properly rely upon the incumbent administration's views of wise policy to inform its judgments").
47. Charlie Savage, Shift on Executive Power Lets Obama Bypass Rivals, N.Y.
TIMEs, April 23, 2012, at Al.
48. See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 45, at 2250-51 (emphasis added) (noting inconsistency between view of President-agency relationship as constrained by Congress, and,
alternatively, "Clinton's use of what I call directive authority-his commands to executive branch officials to take specified actions within their statutorily delegated discretion"); Savage, supra note 47 (describing the Obama Administration's focus on
regulatory actions that do not require legislation and abandonment of proposals criticized as inconsistent with statutes).
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dict a statute, agency action is almost certainly unlawful; 49 when Congress has given clear authority to agencies to regulate a certain
subject matter, agency action is obviously permitted.5 0 But emerging
science and technology present the fuzzy cases. When the subject
matter is arguably a "game-changer"- creating conflicts and relationships that citizens have not yet had an opportunity to debate-it may
be thought that existing statutes can be read broadly by agencies to
apply to the new technology. At the same time, where no public debate has occurred about potentially game-changing technologies, it
may reasonably be argued that no legislative delegation can have occurred at all. When it comes to potentially game-changing technological and scientific developments, how new is too new? When it comes
to broad readings of existing authority, how far is too far?
Major scientific and technological breakthroughs paint democratic participation concerns in sharp relief because of their very novelty.5 1 One of the key substantive characteristics of deliberative
democracy, as articulated by Joshua Cohen and others,5 2 is that its
institutions move beyond mere expression of "pre-political preferences"53 of the majority. Instead, through the requirement that poli49. For example, the Obama Administration backed off an early attempt to change
the repayment timing for federal student loans after challenges that it had no authority
to alter the congressionally-designated rule. See Savage, supra note 47. It is important
to emphasize that the unlawfulness of such action is only "almost" certain. Courts have
upheld agency actions that directly conflict with statutory requirements, if strict textual
application of the statute would produce results apparently inconsistent with congressional intent. See Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102 (D.C. Cir.
2012) (upholding EPA decision in conjunction with Endangerment Finding to set greenhouse gas regulation threshold at higher level than described by Clean Air Act); cf Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 429 (1998) (applying the absurdity doctrine to
support judicial interpretation of statute); Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S.
440, 454-55 (1989). But see John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARv. L.
REV. 2387, 2390 (2003) (criticizing the absurdity doctrine as inconsistent with strict
textualist trend of modem Supreme Court jurisprudence).
50. See Stack, supra note 2.
51. While administrative law scholars have argued for ever increasing expansion
of the power of the executive branch to act without direct mandate from Congress, political scientists and constitutional scholars have been devising and advocating mechanisms to promote greater accountability of the political process to the people. See
generally Joseph Bessette, Deliberative Democracy: The Majority Principle in Republican Government, in How DEMOCRATIC IS THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION? (Robert Dahl
ed., 2d ed. 2003); Amy GUTIANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT

(1998); Joshua Cohen, Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy, in DELIBERATIVE DEMocRAcy: ESSAYS ON REASON AND POLITICS 67 (James Bohman & William Rehg eds.,
1997); see also Michael R. Harris, Environmental Deliberative Democracy and the
Search for Administrative Legitimacy: A Legal Positivism Approach, 44 U. MIcH. J.L.

REFORM 343 (2011) (offering a legal positivist approach to improving democratic involvement in the environmental regulatory process).
52.

See generally Bessette, supra note 51; Cohen, supra note 51.

53. This term is not used by Cohen, but may be found in other descriptions of the
theory. See, e.g., Staszewski, supra note 46, at 852.
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cies be justified with reference to the common good on terms that all
reasonable people could accept, deliberative democracy is intended to
shape the views of all citizens, even of those whose pre-political preferences might otherwise have constituted a majority. This occurs in two
ways. First, "the practice of presenting reasons will contribute to the
formation of a commitment to the deliberative resolution of political
questions."5 4By participating in the process of deliberative democracy,
citizens become more likely to internalize its ideal of justifying preferences based on the common good. This commitment will lead to a
greater likelihood of advancing arguments with genuine reference to
that ideal, rather than merely cloaking pre-political preferences in
language likely to be accepted within that system. Second, it may alter the actual content of a citizen's views-from pre-political preferences to those more readily acceptable by reference to the common
good. "Assuming a commitment to deliberative justification, the discovery that I can offer no persuasive reasons on behalf of a proposal of
55
mine may transform the preferences that motivate the proposal." In
other words, a commitment to deliberation may affect both (1) which
of his preferences a citizen decides to advance in the political process,
and on what basis; and (2) the content of the preferences that a citizen
actually holds to after deliberation.5 6
Emerging science and technology raise an unusual dilemma from
a standpoint of deliberative democracy. Cohen's term presumes that
citizens possess, at some "pre-political" stage, a certain amount of information, such as facts about the activity to be subject to law, knowledge of the policy options available, and information about the likely
impacts of a given policy. With new science and technology, however,
most citizens have not yet had enough information or opportunity to
form even "pre-political preferences" about the issues raised by the
new developments. 5 7 Until citizens have had a meaningful opportunity to understand and form opinions about new developments, decisions can only be made by the small minority who have such
knowledge and experience.
54. Cohen, supra note 51, at 76.
55. Id.
56. Cohen, supra note 51, at 72-73. But see Lynn M. Sanders, Against Deliberation, 25 POL. THEORY 347, 349 (1997) (arguing that the views of uninvolved citizens are
due the respect that a free flow of values and ideas requires).
57. Most citizens do have pre-political preferences with regard to general issues
implicated by new science and technology, such as belief in science for defining limits of
legal controls, or trust in federal and state regulators. See infra notes 60-80 and accompanying text (surveys discussing general science awareness and attitudes toward technology regulation). Nevertheless, those opinions are general and may not control a
citizen's response to a particular new technology. See discussion infra notes 70-80 and
accompanying text.
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IV. DEMOCRATIC PROCESS IN THE CREATION OF THE GMO
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
Testifying before Congress in 1985 about genetically modified organism ("GMO") technology, Dr. Frank Young, the Commissioner of
the FDA, emphasized the need for public participation in the establishment of legal controls over the technology at the advent of its commercialization. Quoting geneticist Tracy Sonneborn, Dr. Young told
Congress that the following statement was "particularly applicable ...
today":5 8
The human problems raised by these new possibilities are not
fundamentally different from the problems Huxley put
forceably before the public. They are the problems of morals,
ethics, religions and politics..

.

. How they will be used obvi-

ously will not be decided by scientists alone. Nor should this
be decided alone by professional politicians or theologians or
by philosophers or by moralists. It must be decided on an enlightened and broadly based public opinion.5 9
Was the GMO regulatory structure established in the 1980s in
fact "decided on an enlightened and broadly based public opinion"? Or
did the 1986 Coordinated Framework, 1992 Final Statement on Scope,
and subsequent federal agency regulations and policies impede democratic deliberation on GMOs? There is no way to prove what would
have happened in a parallel universe in which no regulatory framework was created under pre-existing laws. It is possible, however, to
approach this question by analyzing the way the GMO regulatory
framework was created, and its reception since then.
First, how much did the public know or understand about biotechnology at the advent of its commercialization? Did the public want the
new technology to be controlled, and did it trust federal regulators to
exercise those controls? Second, how much opportunity did the public
have to participate in the creation of the biotechnology control framework-either through executive channels that ultimately held sway,
or through the alternative legislative process that might have held
sway? Taken together, the answers to these questions may shed some
light on the level of democratic consensus involved in the initial choice
to regulate rather than legislate.

58. Biotechnology Regulation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong. 16 (1984) [hereinafter Hearing on Biotechnology Regulation].
59. Id.
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MUCH DID THE PUBLIC KNow ABOUT BIOTECHNOLOGY IN

1980s?

In 1987, the former congressional Office of Technology Assessment ("OTA") issued a report on its survey of public perceptions about
biotechnology.6 0 This survey considered public awareness of and attitudes about science and technology in general, and about the new biotechnology in particular. The survey suggests two things: first, the
level of public awareness and understanding of biotechnology was relatively low in the mid-1980s when the 1986 Coordinated Framework
was announced, and second, Americans did feel that strict regulation
of the new industry was important, but did not have strong trust in
federal agencies.
In its survey, the OTA classified respondents as "science observant" if they described themselves as having a very good understanding of science, being very interested in science, or being very
concerned about science policy. 6 ' The OTA found that slightly less
than half (forty-seven percent) of the U.S. population could be classified as "science observant."6 2 The OTA survey determined that the
science observant, however, were not much more likely than the norm
to have voted in recent congressional or local elections, campaigned for
a candidate, or written to a public official. 6 3
Public awareness of biotechnology in particular was not high.
The OTA survey found that thirty-five percent of respondents had
heard "a lot" (six percent) or "a fair amount" (twenty-nine percent)
about genetic engineering. 6 4 In contrast, sixty-three percent had
heard "almost nothing" (twenty-four percent) or "relatively little"
(thirty-nine percent) about it. 65 Despite this substantial rate of unfamiliarity with the subject, OTA reported that "more than half of
American adults (fifty-six percent) can provide a meaningful-if not
necessarily strictly accurate-explanation of genetic engineering."6 6
60.

See generally OFFICE

OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, NEw DEVELOPMENTS IN BIOTECH-

NOLOGY: PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF BIOTECHNOLOGY

(May 1987), available at http://www.

fas.org/ota/reports/8721.pdf.
61. Id. at 20.
62. Id. This included 16% who rated their basic understanding of science and technology as "very good"; 23% who described themselves as "very interested" in science and
technology; and 22% who report that they are "very concerned" about science policy. Id.
at 13, 14, 19. Some respondents were included in more than one of the categories.
63. Id. at 21.
64. Id. at 45. The OTA describes this level of awareness as "moderate." Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 47. The survey offered a variety of potential responses for respondents to
select. The most common response chosen, after the response of "Don't know," was,
"Altering/manipulating genes" (20%). Id. at 46. Other options provided by the survey,
such as "Producing improved/superior organisms" and "Altering gene to produce desired/specific result," were chosen by three to six percent of respondents. Id.
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Support for advancement of the technology was clear: a majority
of respondents supported equal or increased government support for
biotechnology research, 67 and most supported small-scale field tests.6 8
When asked about large-scale environmental releases (short of commercial release), however, respondents were more skeptical: fiftythree percent said firms should not be able to make such releases,
even "if the risks of environmental danger are judged to be very
small."6 9
Most Americans did not have fully-formed opinions about biotechnology. As late as 1994, one study, based on a survey of New Jersey
residents, noted that "many respondents had not thought a great deal
about the issues surrounding biotechnology."70 Interviewers and interview monitors noted that "[m]any respondents were quite introspective, carefully considering their answers, as if they were really
thinking about the issues for the first time."7 1 The study authors concluded that "most citizens seem to be in the initial stages of making up
their minds about this new technology" and had not formed an opinion
that the technology was universally morally acceptable or
unacceptable. 72
Public opinion about regulation was also ambivalent. As a general matter, Americans were about evenly split on the need for technology regulation generally. 73 With regard to biotechnology, however,
Americans did favor regulation. OTA found that seventy-seven percent of the public agreed with the statement that "'the potential danger from genetically altered cells and microbes is so great that strict
regulations are necessary." 7 4 Forty-three percent of respondents
"strongly agree[d]" with the statement.7 5
Whom did the public want to do the regulating? Survey respondents reported relatively low trust in federal agencies. When asked
whether they would believe statements about the risk of a biotech
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 83.
Id. at 84.
Id. at 87-88.

70.

WILLIAM K. HALLMAN & JENNIFER METCALFE, PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF AGRICUL-

TURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY: A SURVEY OF NEW JERSEY RESIDENTS 35 (1994), available at

http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/18170/1/pa94ha0l.pdf.
71. Id. at 35.
72. Id. at 36.
73. A majority (54%) of respondents to the OTA survey disagreed with the statement, "Unless technological development is restrained, the overall safety of our society
will be jeopardized significantly in the next 20 years." OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT,

supra note 61, at 30 tbl.16. College graduates were the most likely to disagree with the
statement (74% to 23%). Id. The percentage of the public favoring increased control
over technology, however, had increased from 28% in 1972 to 43% in the mid-1980s. Id.
at 31.
74. Id. at 81.
75. Id.
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product from various groups, respondents were more inclined to believe university scientists, public health officials, and environmental
groups than federal agencies.7 6 Similarly, respondents were asked to
imagine a case in which a federal agency said a genetically altered
organism did not pose a significant risk, but a national environmental
group said it did.77 Respondents were far more likely to believe the
environmental group (sixty-three percent) than the federal agency
(twenty-six percent).7 8 When asked who should be in charge of determining whether large-scale releases should be permitted, a plurality
of respondents (thirty-seven percent) chose "government agency."7 9
Another five percent, however, did not choose from among the options
suggested by the survey ("company that developed the product; external scientific body; government agency; industrial trade association")
but instead chose "other group" and wrote in choices such as "Public/
voters/taxpayers/community."8 0 The results of the OTA survey suggest that a majority of Americans in the 1980s thought biotech should
be regulated, but may not have confidently entrusted the creation of
the regulatory scheme to federal agencies.
B.

DID THE PUBLIC SUPPORT THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK?

The regulatory process itself includes opportunities for citizen
participation, and the sufficiency of these procedures for democratic
legitimacy has been the focus of scholarly debate since the early days
of the administrative state.8 1 Some concerns raised by critics of the
administrative state are apparent in the creation of the GMO regulatory framework, casting doubt on any suggestion that immediate regulation of GMOs under pre-existing statutes reflected any considered
public preference at the time, express or implied.
76. Id. at 89-90. Respondents were asked to indicate whether they would "definitely believe," would be "inclined to believe," would be "inclined not to believe," would
"definitely not believe," or were "not sure." Id. University officials received significantly
higher credibility ratings (nineteen percent would "definitely believe," sixty-seven percent would be "inclined to believe") than federal agencies (nine percent "definitely believe," sixty percent would be "inclined to believe"). Id. at 90. Although the OTA
tabular material on page 90 does not identify how many would "definitely believe" federal agencies, the accompanying text indicates that a total of sixty-nine percent were at
least "inclined to believe."
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 88-89.
80. Id. at 89, 108. The survey question asked, "'Who should be responsible for deciding whether or not commercial firms should be permitted to apply genetically altered
organisms on a large-scale basis- the company that developed the product, an external
scientific body, a government agency, an industrial trade association, or other group"?
The survey gave respondents the options of choosing one of the enumerated entities, or
choosing "other group" and specifying their answers. Id. at 108.
81. See supra notes 58-79 and accompanying text.
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First, these policies occurred in a different era of regulatory action-the pre-Internet era. Agency comments can now be submitted
electronically, and voter signatures can similarly be obtained through
the Internet. For example, the USDA's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service received more than 66,000 comments on its 2008 proposal to revise its regulations regarding the importation, interstate
movement and environmental release of certain GMOs. 8 2 In contrast,
executive documents opened for public comment in the 1980s received
far less direct public input. The 1984 proposed Coordinated Framework, for example, was opened for comment on December 31, 1984,
requesting comments addressed directly to the relevant agencies or to
the OSTP.8 3 In a 1985 notice, the OSTP reported that it had received
seventy-nine comments to the OSTP, thirty-four to the FDA, sixtyeight to the EPA, and fifty to the USDA. 8 4 Similarly, early regulations defining the USDA's oversight procedures under the PPA received fewer than two hundred comments.8 5 In the 1986 Coordinated
Framework, OSTP invited comments but announced that the policy
would be effective immediately.8 6 The Biotechnology Science Coordinating Council, an interagency coordinating group created by the
OSTP to address scientific issues related to biotechnology, scheduled
its first public hearing for July 9, 1986-two weeks after publication of
the final 1986 Coordinated Framework document.8 7
However, the number of comments on proposed regulations may
be moot. Political scientists have generally concluded that public comments on proposed regulations make little difference in the final out82. Email from Richard S. Coker, Regulatory & Envtl. Analysis Branch, Biotechnology Regulatory Servs., USDA, to author (Aug. 18, 2009) (on file with author) (referring to comments received on Proposed Rule; Importation, Interstate Movement and
Release Into the Environment of Certain Genetically Engineered Organisms, 73 Fed.
Reg. 60,008, (Oct. 9, 2008)).
83. Proposed Coordinated Framework, supra note 23, at 50856.
84. See Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology; Establishment of
the Biotechnology Science Coordinating Committee, 50 Fed. Reg. 47,174, 47,174 (Nov.
14, 1985) [hereinafter OSTP - Coordinated Framework].
85. See Genetically Engineered Organisms and Products; Notification Procedures
for the Introduction of Certain Regulated Articles; and Petition for Nonregulated Status, 58 Fed. Reg. 17,044, 17,044 (Mar. 31, 1993) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 340)
(reporting eighty-four comments received on proposed rule); Introduction of Organisms
and Products, supra note 16, at 22,892 (reporting the final rule and thatl84 comments
had been received on the proposed rule, including comments received at public hearing).
86. See 1986 Coordinated Framework, supra note 15, at 23,302.
87. See The Biotechnology Science Coordination Act of 1986: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Natural Resources, Agriculture Research and Environment and the Subcomm. on Science, Research and Technology of the H. Comm. on Science and Technology,
99th Cong. 36 (1986) [hereinafter Hearing on 1986 Act], available at http://babel.hathi

trust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015013107316;view=lup;seq=3 (statement of David T. Kingsbury, Chairman, Biotechnology Science Coordinating Committee).
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come of regulations. 8 8 But more recent research has suggested that
public input at the rule development stage-before any proposed regulation is issued-does have substantial impact on the outcome of regulations.89 One study of commenter influence after Advanced Notice of
Proposed Rulemakings showed significant influence: when most commenters wanted less regulation, the proposed rules moved toward less
regulation almost seventy percent of the time.9 0 When early commenters wanted to see more regulation, the rules followed suit approximately fifty-percent of the time.9 1 Moreover, organized interest
groups such as businesses appear to dominate public input on rule
development, just as they do in the less influential notice and comment phase. 92 Anecdotal reports suggest cooperation between the
White House and the biotechnology industry during the development
of the 1986 Coordinated Framework outside the formal notice and
comment process. 9 3
Important aspects of the regulatory framework were established
entirely outside the notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures of the
Administrative Procedure Act 9 4 ("APA"). For example, in 1992 FDA
issued a policy statement that new biotech foods would not need to be
submitted for food additive review and were not required to be specially labeled.9 5 In a lawsuit by consumer groups challenging the
FDA's labeling policy, a federal district court rejected a claim that the
88. See, e.g., Marissa Martino Golden, Interest Groups in the Rule-Making Process:
Who Participates? Whose Voices Get Heard?, 8 J. PUa. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 245
(1998); William F. West, Formal Procedures, Informal Procedures,Accountability, and
Responsiveness in BureaucraticPolicy Making: An InstitutionalPolicy Analysis, 64 PUB.
ADMIN. REv. 66 (2004). But see Susan Webb Yackee, Assessing Inter-InstitutionalAttention to and Influence on Government Regulations, 36 BaRIT. J. POL. Sci. 723 (2006) (find-

ing evidence of commenter influence during notice and comment period).
89. See Keith Naughton et al., UnderstandingCommenter Influence DuringAgency
Rule Development, 28 J. PoL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 258 (2009).
90. Id. at 272.
91. Id.

92. Id. This data led the study authors to conclude that "overall influence of interest groups during the regulatory policymaking process is, in all likelihood, underestimated in studies that do not take into account the politics of the rule development
stage." Id.
93. For example, a biotechnology industry association representative testified to
Congress that he had received a draft copy of EPA's guidelines for the final Coordinated
Framework. See Hearing on 1986 Act, supra note 87, at 79 (statements of Richard Godown, Executive Director, Industrial Biotechnology Association, and Dr. Alan Goldhammer). As of the date of the hearing, the Domestic Policy Council was still reviewing the
draft Coordinated Framework and was unable to testify as to the "precise wording" of
the final version. See id. at 16-18. The industry representative also testified that he
and a witness from OSTP had exchanged drafts of their testimony prior to the hearing.
See id. at 80.

94. Ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5
U.S.C.).
95. See FDA - Statement of Policy, supra note 38, at 22,984.
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policy statement should have been promulgated through notice-andcomment rulemaking.9 6 A policy statement may avoid APA rulemaking requirements, the court observed, if it does not impose any new
rights or obligations, or restrain policymakers from exercising discretion.9 7 The court held that the policy statement left the agency with
discretion, and thus did not have the "force and effect of law" that triggers APA rulemaking procedure.9 8 The court focused on the fact that
the policy statement announced merely a presumption, not a rule,
that biotech foods would be "generally recognized as safe" ("GRAS")
under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 9 9 ("FDCA"). 0 0 The
court did not consider whether the food labeling interpretation of the
FDCA might trigger notice and comment, however, even though the
FDA's interpretation of the misbranding section of the FDCA was not
similarly stated as a presumption. FDA has since relied on that interpretation to deny consumers' claims that they have a right to receive
information about whether foods contain GMO ingredients.' 0 '

C.

DID THE PUBLIC REJECT NEw LEGISLATION?

At around the same time the White House was preparing the
1986 Coordinated Framework and agencies were announcing initial
policy statements and proposed regulations, numerous congressional
committees convened hearings to consider whether new legislation
was needed for the new technology.10 2 In a 1984 hearing on the ade96. Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, 116 F. Supp. 2d 166, 172-73 (D.D.C. 2000).
97.

Alliance for Bio-Integrity, 116 F. Supp. 2d at 172.

98. Id.
99. Ch. 675, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as amended 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399f
(2012)).
100.

Alliance for Bio-Integrity, 116 F. Supp. 2d at 179.

101. In its substantive analysis of the FDA's GRAS presumption and labeling provisions under the arbitrary and capricious standard, the court also granted Chevron deference to the FDA's interpretation of the FDCA. See id. at 178 (citing Chevron, U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)). This standard of review is
of questionable viability with regard to policy statements because of the United States
Supreme Court's decision in U.S. v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218 (2001) (stating congressional
delegations to agencies not intended to have the force and effect of law are entitled only
to deference proportional to their power to persuade). It is unclear whether this lower
level of deference, however, would have affected the outcome of the court's ruling, which
was sympathetic to the FDA's reading of the FDCA.
102. See, e.g., Federal Oversight of Biotechnology: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on
Hazardous Wastes and Toxic Substances, Senate Comm. On Environment and Public
Works, 100th Cong. 441 (1987); Releasing Genetically Engineered Organisms Into the
Environment: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Toxic Substances and Environmental
Oversight of the Senate Comm. On Environment and Public Works, 99th Cong. 740
(1986); Hearing on 1986 Act, supra note 87, at 89; Biotechnology Development: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 99th Cong. 53 (1985); Planned Releases of Genetically-Altered Organisms:
The Status of Government Research and Regulation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On
Investigations and Oversight of the House Comm. On Science and Technology, 99th
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quacy of the legislative structure to regulate new biotechnology, the
subcommittee chairman took notice of the Reagan Administration's
ongoing review of agency authority under existing statutes, as well as
the differences between the role of agencies and the role of Congress
when faced with new technology:
The administration must begin by working within the authority it has. We in the Congress are aware that the existing
legislation was not drafted with biotechnology in mind - either to promote its development or to protect against its associated risks. Thus, even the most appropriate and intelligent
operation of current programs may not suffice, and may bring
special problems that cannot be properly addressed. 103
In 1985, Representative Don Fuqua of Florida, chairman of the
House Committee on Science and Technology, introduced a bill to define the regulatory structure for biotechnology products.104 The Biotechnology Science Coordination Act of 1986 ("H.R. 4452") would have
amended the TSCA to provide for a three-level regulatory review of
field testing and commercial use of biotech products by the USDA and
the EPA. A companion bill was introduced in the Senate by Senators
Dave Durenberger of Minnesota and Max Baucus of Montana. 0 5 Although H.R. 4452 was the subject of several hearings, it was not
brought to a vote by the ninety-ninth Congress. 0 6 The Omnibus Biotechnology Act of 1990,107 the final legislative attempt to alter the
1986 Coordinated Framework, was not reported out of committee. 0 8
Cong. 72 (1985) [hereinafter Hearing on Planned Releases]; Biotechnology Regulation:
HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigationsof the House Comm. On
Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong. 193 (1984); see e.g., Hearingon Biotechnology Regulation, supra note 58; Environmental Implications of Genetic Engineering: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Natural Resources, Agriculture Research and the Environment
and the Subcomm. on Science, Research and Technology of the House Comm. on Science
and Technology, 98th Cong. 36 (1983) [hereinafter Hearing on Environmental
Implications].
103. Hearing on Biotechnology Regulation, supra note 58, at 2.

104. H.R. 4452, 99th Cong. (1986).
105. S. 1967, 99th Cong. (1985).
106. See Bill Summary & Status: 99th Congress (1985-1986): H.R. 4452, LIma. CONTHOMAS, http://thomas.loc.gov/home/LegislativeData.php?&n=BSS&c=99 (select

GRESS

"Fuqua, Don [D-FL-21" in the "Choose House Members" field; select the subheading "Department Operations, Research, and Foreign Agriculture" under "Agriculture" in the
"Choose House Committee" field; then click the "Search" button; then follow "H.R.4452"
hyperlink) (last visited Sep. 28, 2012).
107. 15 U.S.C. § 2601-2697 (2012).
108. H.R. 5232, 101st Cong. (1990); see Adam D. Sheingate, Promotion v. Precaution: The Evolution of Biotechnology Policy in the United States, 36 Barr. J. Pot. ScI.

243, 251-52 (2006); see also Mary Ellen Jones, Politically Corrected Science: Early Negotiation of U.S. Agricultural Biotechnology Policy 317-24 (Nov. 19, 1999) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University) (on file with
Virginia Tech's Digital Library and Archives, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State
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Throughout a series of hearings beginning in the ninety-eighth
Congress in 1983, legislators repeatedly expressed concern about the
need to inform or to reassure the public of the safety of the new technology. 0 9 Subcommittee members cited various reasons for public
concern. Some members focused on past disasters arising from introduction of non-native species into ecosystems, such as kudzu and
gypsy moths.110 Other members cited unanticipated and catastrophic
failures of other technologies, such as the nuclear accidents and the
Bhopal gas leak tragedy.111
In a 1986 hearing on a proposed bill to regulate biotechnology, the
subcommittee chairman emphasized that one purpose of the bill was
to instill confidence in the public that the testing of biotechnology and
the resulting products were safe.112 The need for public assurance
also motivated one of the first hearings held on biotechnology, designed to consider the potential consequences of general release of genetically modified organisms ("GMOs") into the environment and the
University), available at http://scholar.lib.vt.edu/theses/available/etd-120199-091346/
unrestricted/MEJ-etd-modified.pdf.
109.

See, e.g., Hearing on 1986 Act, supra note 87, at 14 (statement of Rep. Claudine

Schneider) ("I think that the proposal for public hearings and public participation is of
utmost importance because we are on the edge of a new and emerging era . . . ."); Hearing on Biotechnology Regulation, supra note 58, at 78 (statement of Rep. John Dingell)

("On regulating biotechnology, one of our major problems is the high level of uncertainty
that now exists, or at leas the high level of lack of public confidence in scientific uncertainty."); Hearing on Biotechnology Regulation, supra note 58, at 78 (statement of

Bernadine Healy Bulkley, Deputy Director, Office of Science and Technology Policy)
(stating NIH RAC guidelines provided "an opportunity for the public to air its concerns
and to have them addressed directly by a group of scientific experts," that NIH press
"played a vital role in educating the public," and that congressional hearings aid in
'airing public concerns").
110.

See, e.g., Hearing on Environmental Implications,supra note 102, at 1. Nega-

tive impacts on ecosystems have, in fact, begun to occur in recent years. In some cases,
the cause has been excessive use of herbicides like Roundup, which many agricultural
products were genetically engineered to resist, rather than from the genetically-engineered traits themselves. See William Neuman & Andrew Pollack, Farmers Cope With
Round-Up Resistant Weeds, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2010, at B1; GMOs Breed 'Superweeds,'
Study Says, PESTICIDE & Toxic CHEMICAL NEws, Jan. 25, 2010, at 6. In other cases,

scientists have discovered genetically-engineered strains of plants growing widely in the
wild, potentially competing with native, non-modified counterparts. See Andrew Pollack, Canola, Pushedby Genetics, Moves Into UnchartedTerritories,N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9,
2010; Geoffrey Brumfiel, Genetically Modified Canola 'Escapes'Farm Fields,NPR (Aug.

6, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=129010499.
111.

See Hearing on Biotechnology Regulation, supra note 58, at 6-7.

112. Hearing on 1986 Act, supra note 87, at 3-4 (statement of Rep. Fuqua). "[Ilt is
hoped that this visible and public process - and I have to underline that, Mr. Chairman
- of testing biotechnology products will instill the confidence in the general public that
the testing is controlled and safe and that the eventual commercial products can be
safely used." Id. at 9-10. "I think the public would have much greater confidence in
what we're attempting to do if there was some type of uniform guidelines." Id.
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need for legislation. 113 Ecologists testified that biotechnology products might interact with other organisms in the environment, and
that scientists have no reliable models for predicting the probability or
scope of risk from the introduction of non-native species.1 14
During this period, legislators devoted substantial attention to assessing whether the existing statutes identified by the Reagan Administration gave agencies sufficient authority to regulate biotechnology.
Members of Congress expressed different (and equivocal) views on the
question. Representative John Dingell, chairman of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, in particular expressed doubts
about the scope of existing authority. 115 Referring to statutes including the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act1 16
("FIFRA"), the Toxic Substances Control Act1 17 ("TSCA"), and the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Acta18 ("FDCA"), Dingell noted
that "a lot of these statutes are somewhat old . .. We never considered
recombinant DNA and any of the techniques which would be used in
exploiting that particular discovery."1 19 Dingell analogized the regulation of biotechnology under existing statutes to the well-documented
error that "generals always fight the war they are in with the last
war's techniques and equipment." 1 20 Dingell said that the FDCA was
probably written with sufficient breadth to cover the new technology,
but "I am not sure Congress had the same wisdom in other
statutes."121
In particular, a great deal of congressional attention focused on
whether the TSCA, which gave the EPA jurisdiction over chemicals,
was sufficiently broad to encompass biotechnology. 1 2 2 The TSCA
113.

Hearing on Environmental Implications, supra note 102, at 2 (statement of

Rep. Albert Gore Jr.).
114. See id. at 5-16 (statement of Dr. Martin Alexander, Cornell University); id. at
18-28 (statement of Dr. Frances Sharples, Oak Ridge National Laboratory).
115.

See Hearing on Biotechnology Regulation, supra note 58, at 72-73, 83 (state-

ment of Rep. Dingell).
116. Ch. 125, 61 Stat. 163 (1947) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 136- 1 36 y
(2012)).
117. Pub. L. No. 94-469, 90 Stat. 2003 (1976) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. (2012)).
118. Ch. 675, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as amended 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399f
(2012)).
119.

Hearing on Biotechnology Regulation, supra note 58, at 72-73.

120.
121.

Id. at 83.
Id. at 73.

122. See, e.g., Issues in the Federal Regulation of Biotechnology: From Research to
Release, Report of Subcomm. on Investigationsand Oversight of the H. Comm. on Science and Technology, 99th Cong., 58-62 (1986) [hereinafter Issues in the FederalRegulation of Biotechnology]; Hearing on 1986 Act, supra note 87, at 3 (statement of Rep.
Fuqua); Hearingon EnvironmentalImplications, supra note 102, at 32-33 (statement of

Rep. Gore). The EPA has relied on TSCA to review new intergeneric microorganisms.
See Biotechnology Program Under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), ENVTL.
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gives the EPA authority to regulate any "significant new use" of a
"chemical substance." 123 The EPA defined living organisms as "chemical substance [s],"'124 and microorganisms created through biotechnology met the definition of "new"; therefore biotechnology was subject to
Pre-Market Notification requirements.12 5
In the 1983 hearing, Congress received testimony on the scope of
existing environmental regulations from Geoffrey M. Karny, an analyst for the Office of Technology Assessment, the former science advisory body to Congress.12 6 Karny testified that, in his view, the EPA's
authority to regulate "chemical substances" under the TSCA should be
read to include living organisms.1 2 7 However, even under this broad
reading of the statutory language, Karny noted that the TSCA was
primarily a notice-based statute, and might not give EPA sufficient
regulatory authority to require toxicological data or safety studies to
ensure against any substantial environmental risks from biotechnology.1 2 8 Karny suggested that FIFRA might be a more effective tool for
the EPA because its premarket registration procedure required safety
data.129 He concluded, "[W]ith the exception of FIFRA there is no federal law that clearly covers the deliberate release of genetically modified organisms into the environment."13 0
In a 1986 hearing on the 1986 Coordinated Framework, the subcommittee chairman questioned a microbiologist on whether the
TSCA could be read to allow the EPA's definition of inter-generic microorganisms as "significant new uses" of existing chemical substances. The witness conceded that the definition "grates on the
nerves of some scientists."1' 3 The witnesses responded that such a
PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/biotech rule/pubs/fs-001.htm (last visited Oct.

3, 2012).
123. 15 U.S.C. § 2602(2)(A) (2012) (defining "chemical substance"); see also Issues in
the Federal Regulation of Biotechnology, supra note 122, at 58.

124. See Proposed Policy Regarding Certain Microbial Products, 49 Fed. Reg.
50,880, 50,886 (Dec. 31, 1984).
125. See 15 U.S.C. § 2604(a); Statement of Policy: Microbial Products Subject to the
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act and the Toxic Substances Control
Act, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,313, 23,325 (June 26, 1986) (determining that microorganisms
were subject to TSCA "and that through deliberate human intervention contain genetic
material from dissimilar source organisms, are 'new' and therefore subject to
[premarket notification] requirements of TSCA").
126.

Hearing on Environmental Implications, supra note 102, at 30-53.

127. See id. at 32-33. Representative Gore noted that the United States Supreme
Court had interpreted the federal utility patent law, 35 U.S.C. § 101, to extend to living
organisms. Id. at 32 (referring to Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980)).
128.
129.
130.
131.

Hearing on Environmental Implications, supra note 102, at 33.
Hearing on Environmental Implications, supra note 102, at 34.
Hearing on Environmental Implications, supra note 102, at 35.
See Issues in the Federal Regulation of Biotechnology, supra note 122, at 59

(statement of Dr. Monica Riley, American Society for Microbiology).
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"strainfed]" construction was necessary because the statute pre-dated
biotechnology:
So it bothers us a little in the sense that that's not the way
you would define it if you were starting from scratch, ... But
in view of the fact that these people are working with an existing statute and with TSCA, I think that they've done the
best that could be done.1 32
While some members of Congress expressly questioned the EPA's
authority under the TSCA, other testimony suggests that other members of Congress believed that agency authority under some existing
statutes was adequate. In a 1984 letter to the President's lead science
advisor at the Office of Science and Technology Policy ("OSTP") and
chair of the Cabinet Council Working Group on Biotechnology, House
committee and subcommittee chairs advised that "[w]e believe that
existing legislation is probably adequate to provide for appropriate
federal review of both research and commercialization of
biotechnology."1 3 3
In a hearing on the 1986 House bill, the committee chairman,
Representative Donald Fuqua, was asked whether the bill was necessary to give agencies sufficient authority to regulate genetically engineered products intended for release into the environment. Although
Representative Fuqua initially deferred the question to counsel,1 he
later responded, "I don't think we're really extending any authority
that they do not currently have or is not currently on law."' 3 5 Instead,
the bill was intended to coordinate agency procedures to streamline
industry applications and ensure public confidence in the system.' 3 6
In the hearings, Congress heard testimony from representatives
of federal agencies and science advisors within the Reagan Administration regarding their sense of the adequacy of existing legislation.
The deputy director of the OSTP, Bernadine Healy Bulkley, described
the work and recommendations of an inter-agency working group that
began work in April 1984. That work included evaluating the scope of
existing regulatory authority; developing policy statements by the
EPA, the FDA and the USDA; and creating an inter-agency scientific
review mechanism.13 7 Finally, the working group recommended crea132. Id. at 58-59.
133.

See Hearing on Biotechnology Regulation, supra note 58, at 69-70 (reprinting

letter from Reps. John D. Dingell, Henry A. Waxman, George E. Brown Jr., and Albert
Gore, Jr., to George A Keyworth II, Science Advisor to the President, Office of Science
and Technology Policy, May 24, 1984).
134.

See Hearing on 1986 Act, supra note 87, at 9.

135. Id.
136. Id.
137.

See Hearing on Biotechnology Regulation, supra note 58, at 12 (statement of

Bernadine Healy Bulkley).
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tion of "an ongoing coordinated mechanism to address the broader issues within the regulatory process."' 3 8 The purpose of this body was
to monitor changes in biotechnology and "to serve as a means of identifying potential gaps in regulation in a timely fashion, making appropriate recommendations for either administrative or legal action."' 3 9
When asked whether the working group had identified any gaps
in current regulatory authority, Bulkley responded, "I think it is very
important to stress that we shouldn't be dogmatic about that, and that
it is important to have a dynamic mechanism in place which can monitor this, and point to areas that could be gaps."14 0 In response to a
request from a subcommittee member to submit a full answer on that
subject for the record, Bulkley submitted the following testimony:
Although at the present time no gaps in statutory authority
to protect the public health and safety have been identified, it
is important for the Federal Government to have in place a
mechanism to monitor the research, development and commercialization of products processes [sic] in an emerging field
such as biotechnology for situations in which new legislation
is warranted.... When such a need becomes apparent, the
administration will recommend appropriate action by
Congress.141
Federal agency representatives also testified that existing legislation appeared adequate, and that the agencies would monitor the
technology and request additional authority if necessary. For example, a witness from the USDA, Karen Darling, testified that the USDA
had begun to regulate biotechnology under the Federal Plant Pest
Act, 14 2 the Plant Quarantine Act, 143 and the Virus-Serum-Toxin
Act.144 According to Darling, "[wie are, however, constantly reevaluating our regulatory position as the state of the art of biotechnology
changes.. . . If processes or products are shown to require additional
measures, the USDA will amend its regulations or request additional
authority."145 Similarly, the FDA Commissioner, Dr. Frank Young,
138. Id. at 13.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 80.
141. Id. at 81-82.
142. Pub. L. No. 85-36, 71 Stat. 31 (1957) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 150aa150jj), reorganized by Plant Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-224, 114 Stat. 438
(2000) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.).
143. Ch. 308, 37 Stat. 315 (1912) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 151-165, 167)
(repealed 2000).
144. Ch. 145, 37 Stat. 832 (1913) (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 151-158 (2012)); see Hearing on Biotechnology Regulation, supra note 58, at 37 (statement of Karen Darling, Dep-

uty Assistant Secretary, Marketing and Inspection Services, USDA).

145. Hearing on Biotechnology Regulation, supra note 58, at 38 (statement of Karen

Darling, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Marketing and Inspection Services, USDA).
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testified that existing authority was sufficient, and that "if there was
an identifiable loophole" in the FDA's statutory authority, "we must
bring that to the attention of both the administration and
Congress." 146
One of the justifications given by agency representatives for pursuing a regulatory solution was the expediency of such an approach.
Bulkley of OSTP testified that "one of our major concerns in designing
[the 1986 Coordinated Framework] is something that we think would
be operational almost immediately."14 7 She testified that alternative
approaches could have taken up to two years to implement.14 8
Despite the assurance that federal agencies would monitor the
technology and request additional authority when necessary, one
member of Congress expressed concern that putting in place an immediate regulatory solution might have the effect of deflecting public attention away from the issue. Representative Walgren raised this
question to ecologists in discussing the limited development of risk assessment models for biotechnology, despite the attention paid to risk
from laboratory testing at the Asilomar Conference in the 1970s.1 4 9
Representative Walgren asked, "Was there an adequate response in
the scientific community to develop risk assessment in that context, or
did we just become comfortable with the ways that were proposed to
deal with handling that research and, therefore, forget about the
problem?"15 0
As late as 1990, legislation was introduced in the House that
would have overhauled regulation of biotechnology, but the bill was
never reported out of committee.1 5 Some Capitol Hill staffers with
responsibility for biotechnology during that era attributed the waning
of congressional interest in part to the existence and apparent viability of the 1986 Coordinated Framework.1 52 As one commentator
noted, "The [19861 Coordinated Framework, although unable to bring
the controversy to full closure because it never addressed the underlying social and political issues, nevertheless had averted the immediate
146. Id. at 88 (statement of Dr. Frank E. Young, Commissioner, FDA).
147. Id. at 94 (statement of Bernadine Healy Bulkley).
148. Id.
149.

See Hearing on Environmental Implications, supra note 102, at 55 (statement

of Rep. Walgren). The Asilomar conference resulted in the creation of a federal advisory
committee, the Recombinant-DNA Advisory Committee of the National Institute of
Health ("RAC-NIH"). See SHELDON KRIMsKY, BIOTECHNICS AND SOCIETY 183 (1991); see
generally DONALD S. FREDRICKSON, THE RECOMBINANT DNA CONTROVERSY (2001) (pro-

viding a memoir of Asilomar conference and creation of NIH guidelines for recombinantDNA research).
150. Id.
151. Omnibus Biotechnology Act of 1990, H.R. 5232, 101st Cong. (1990).
152. See Sheingate, supra note 108, at 252 (citing interviews with former House and
Senate staff).
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crisis of public clamor for safety by designating a means of oversight of
rDNA research and products in the private sector." 5 3
D.

REGULATION VERSUS LEGISLATION: COMPARING THE APPROACHES

How would the congressional proposal have differed from the regulatory solution actually implemented? Most significantly, the Biotechnology Science Coordination Act of 1986154 ("H.R. 4452") would
have created a permitting structure for all biotechnology products.
Under H.R. 4452, before testing or general release into the environment, all "genetically-engineered organisms" would have been subject
to permitting authority of the EPA or the USDA. The bill would have
given the EPA authority by amending the Toxic Substances Control
Act' 5 5 ("TSCA") to require a permit for any "genetically-engineered
organism," defined by the bill as "a bacterium, virus, fungus, plant
cell, plant tissue, animal cell, or animal tissue which has been deliberately altered to contain genetic material derived from more than one
taxonomic genus, and which is not expressly regulated under section
401 of [this Act] 15 6 or under any other Federal law."15 7 The approach
of H.R. 4452 to create a regulatory structure for all "genetically-engineered organisms" would have departed substantially from the approach of the Final Statement on Scope and the 1986 Coordinated
Framework. The 1986 Coordinated Framework instead established a
policy that any decision to regulate should be based on the characteristics of the final product, not the mere fact that the product was created through the use of biotechnology.15 8
The bill also would have resulted in a legislatively-created Biotechnology Science Coordinating Committee ("BSCC") under the Of153.

Jones, supra note 108, at 323.

154. H.R. 4452, 99th Cong. (1986).
155. Pub. L. No. 94-469, 90 Stat. 2003 (1976) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. (2012)).
156. Section 401 of the H.R. 4452 proposed to create the USDA's regulatory authority over genetically-engineered organisms.
157. H.R. 4452, 99th Cong. § 301(b).
158. The Final Statement on Scope, by its own description, "describes a risk-based
scientifically sound approach to the oversight of planned introductions of biotechnology
products into the environment that focuses on the characteristics of the biotechnology
product and the environment into which it is being introduced, not the process by which
the product is created." 1992 Final Statement on Scope, supra note 35, at 6,753. Simi-

larly, the 1986 Coordinated Framework "takes into account" the recommendations of an
Ad Hoc Group of Gorvernment Experts convened by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD"). The OECD group's recommendations stated,
"There is no scientific basis for specific legislation for the implementation of rDNA technology and applications. Member countries should examine their existing oversight and
review mechanisms to ensure that adequate review and control may be applied while
avoiding any undue burdens that may hamper technological developments in this field."
1986 Coordinated Framework, supra note 15, at 23,308.
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fice of Science and Technology Policy ("OSTP").-5 9 The primary
purposes of the legislatively-created BSCC would have been to coordinate information and promote uniformity and cooperation among federal agencies with regard to biotechnology science. 160 The
legislatively-created BSCC would have required that meetings be
open and that summaries of proceedings be available to the public,
with exceptions for protecting confidential business or commercial information. 16 1 Such meetings would have been announced in the Federal Register at least a week in advance. 162 The BSCC would have
made recommendations for scientific research to a Biotechnology Science Review Program ("BSRP"), housed within the OSTP.16 3 The
BSRP would have been charged with identifying research needs, developing a biotechnology research agenda, and coordinating the use of
public and private resources for biotechnology science review and
regulation.164
In the hearing on the bill, a biotechnology industry witness testified to Congress that the legislatively-created BSCC would be undesirable because it would be difficult to modify or terminate if
circumstances required.' 6 5 The BSCC created by the Reagan Administration, in contrast, was created for a duration of two years, renewable based on review of the "continuing need" for the body.16 6 The
BSCC Charter did not provide for specific democratic accountability
for the decision to terminate the BSCC; nor did the Charter specify
alternative means of performing the information, coordination, and
public participation functions of the BSCC in the event it was not continued.' 6 7 Nonetheless, the acting director of the OSTP described the
work of the Domestic Policy Working Group and the Administration's
BSCC, and he testified that the regulatory structure established by
the executive under existing statutes was sufficient.' 68 The acting di159. H.R. 4452, 99th Cong. §§ 101-104.
160. Id. at § 102.
161. Id. at § 104(b)-(c).
162. Id. at §104(a).
163. Id. at § 201.
164. Id. at § 201(a).
165. See Hearing on 1986 Act, supra note 87, at 84 (statement of Richard Godown,
Executive Director, Industrial Biotechnology Association) ("[I]f it is created statutorily it is kind of like building a brick wall - it is a little difficult to get it down when it is no
longer needed, and it is especially difficult to modify it.").
166. Charter of the Biotechnology Science Coordinating Committee, in Issues in the
Federal Regulation of Biotechnology, supra note 122, at 108, 110 (Appendix D).
167. See generally Charter of the Biotechnology Science Coordinating Committee, in
Issues in the Federal Regulation of Biotechnology, supra note 122, at 108; ); see also
Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology; Establishment of the Biotechnology Science Coordinating Committee, 50 Fed. Reg. 47,174, 47,175-76 (1985).
168. See Hearing on 1986 Act, supra note 87, at 29-30 (statement of Richard G.
Johnson, Acting Director, OSTP).
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rector also testified that the BSRP proposed by the bill would be "an
inappropriate and duplicative role for OSTP." 6 9
The Administration's BSCC was charged with monitoring
changes in biotechnology science and identifying potential gaps in regulations, and making recommendations for additional regulatory or
legislative action.170 The BSCC was dissolved after its members
failed to reach agreement on the scope of organisms that would be
subject to, and exempt from, regulation.171 Its materials were forwarded to the President's Council on Competitiveness, led by thenVice President Dan Quayle to promote U.S. industry.172 The Council
on Competitiveness used the BSCC's materials in finalizing the Final
Statement on Scope in 1992.173
In the 1980s, two parallel conversations were taking place. In the
regulatory conversation, emphasis was placed on streamlining regulation, securing competitive advantage for the U.S. biotechnology industry, and utilizing existing agency authority immediately and
exclusively. This regulatory conversation claimed that there was "[n]o
scientific basis" for new legislation based on the biotechnology process
itself. The regulatory apparatus moved with characteristic speed: a
review and framework of existing regulation with application to biotechnology was proposed in 1984 and finalized in 1986, and the identified federal agencies developed their initial policy statements within a
few years afterward.17 4 In contrast, in the legislative conversation,
emphasis was placed on protecting the environment; reassuring the
public of safety through risk assessment and disclosure; and legislatively filling arguable gaps in agency authority. This conversation
claimed that the question of whether new legislation was needed was
ultimately a political, not a scientific, one. The process moved deliberately: Numerous hearings were convened by various legislative committees during the mid-1980s, and legislation was introduced, but
never brought to a vote, in the House and Senate.
While these two conversations were occurring, the 1986 Coordinated Framework laid the foundation of the regulatory apparatus in
169.
170.

Id. at 30.
See Hearing on Biotechnology Regulation, supra note 58, at 13 (statement of

Bernadine Healy Bulkley).
171. See Emily Marden, Risk and Regulation: U.S. Regulatory Policy on Genetically
Modified Food and Agriculture, 44 B.C. L. REv. 733, 739-40 (2003); see also Proposed

Statement of Scope, supra note 35, at 31,119-20.
172. See Proposed Statement of Scope, supra note 35, at 31,119-20.
173. See id.; see also 1992 Final Statement on Scope, supra note 35, at 6,754; Proposed Statement of Scope, supra note 35, at 31,119-20.
174. See Introduction of Plant Pests, supra note 16; USDA - Genetically Engineered
Organisms and Products, supra note 38; FDA - Statement of Policy, supra note 38; EPA
- Proposed Policy, supra note 38.
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1984 and 1986; the frame was erected by the proceeding agency policy
statements and rulemakings in the late 80s and early 90s; and the
apparatus was secured by the time of the Final Statement on Scope in
1990 and 1992. Did this rapid regulatory action have deliberative consequences, or a "chilling" effect on further public action? Or could the
apparatus have been razed if the public consensus arrived at through
these two conversations had eventually shifted in favor of new and
unique legislative controls on the biotechnology industry? Does the
persistence of the framework signal agreement with it by the majority
of citizens? Consideration of the political and deliberative history on
the biotech debate since the publication of the Final Statement on
Scope offers some insights into these questions.
V. DOES THE PERSISTENCE OF THE REGULATORY
FRAMEWORK INDICATE DEMOCRATIC CONSENSUS
AROUND A REGULATORY SOLUTION?
The relative agility of executive action does not necessarily pose a
constitutional dilemma as long as the regulatory framework does not
substantially chill democratic deliberation. If deliberation does continue without chilling, and if the law is responsive enough to change
as necessary to reflect any new consensus at which the polity ultimately arrives, then prompt regulatory action may be an effective precautionary mechanism while the lengthy process of public debate on
new technology proceeds.
In the case of genetically modified organisms ("GMOs"), even if
the regulatory framework was put in place before the public had
achieved consensus on whether and how to legally control the technology, the 1986 Coordinated Framework and its progeny have now persisted for a quarter-century. During a generation of public debate,
Congress has not passed any new legislation substantially altering
the legislative authority for GMO regulation. Does that persistence
imply public agreement with, or at least acquiescence in, the GMO
regulatory framework under pre-existing legislation?
A.

PRESENT LEVEL OF PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE OF AND SATISFACTION
WITH BIOTECHNOLOGY REGULATION

Research has shown that public debate about biotechnology in the
United States has been far from widespread, particularly among those
who are more skeptical of the technology. In 2005, researchers surveyed Canadian and American adults to determine the effect of informal personal networks on discussion, awareness and perceptions of
genetically-modified foods. Such informal personal networks, along
with news media, are the two leading sources of information about
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new or unknown risks for most people.' 7 5 Remarkably, of 1,200
American adults surveyed in 2006, fifty-three percent said they had
never had a conversation about genetically-modified foods.176 Another
nineteen percent of Americans said they had discussed geneticallymodified foods "once or twice."' 77 Only six percent of Americans said
they had discussed the issue "frequently."' 7 8
Surveys of Americans conducted between 2001 and 2006 for the
Pew Initiative on Food and Biotechnology confirm that most of the
public had not talked about the technology.' 7 9 While the study reported that consumers relied most on friends and loved ones for information about biotechnology,18 0 fifty-four percent of respondents in
2001 said they had heard "not too much" or nothing at all about genetically modified foods sold in grocery stores, and the number of unaware consumers had increased by 2006.181
This lack of discussion correlates closely with a low level of information about biotechnology. In the 2005 survey of Americans and
Canadians, a majority of respondents said they had "heard of' biotechnology, but only ten percent said they were "very familiar" with it.182
About as many-nine percent-of Americans were "not at all familiar"
with it.183 Although the prevalence of genetically modified ("GM")
foods in supermarkets meant that nearly all Americans had consumed
GM foods by the mid-2000s, only twenty-six percent of respondents
during that time period believed they had, while sixty percent believed they had not.18 4 According to the authors of one study, "[WIhile
175.

Roger E. Kasperson et al., The Social Amplification of Risk: A Conceptual

Framework, 8 RISK ANALYSIS 177, 184 (1988).

176. William K. Hallman, PredictingApproval and Discussion of Genetically Modified Foods in Canada and the United States, in FIRST IMPRESSIONS: UNDERSTANDING
PUBLIC VIEWS ON EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES 20, 29 (Edna F. Einseidel ed., 2005).

177. Id.
178. Id. In the United States, respondents with more positive reactions to the word
"biotechnology" were more likely to have discussed the issue, whereas Canadian respondents with more pessimistic views on the issue were more likely to have discussed it.
Id. at 33. Both Americans and Canadians were more likely to have discussed the issue if
they perceived risk associated with the technology, but the correlation among U.S. respondents was less than half of that among Canadian respondents. Id. at 34. Americans were more likely to have discussed biotechnology if they found GMO research
morally acceptable, while Canadians were more likely to have discussed it if they found
GMO research morally unacceptable. Id.
179. Memorandum from The Mellman Group, Inc. to The Pew Initiative on Food
and Biotechnology (Nov. 16, 2006) [hereinafter Pew Initiative] (on file with author),
available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/PublicOpinion/Food-andBiotechnology/2006summary.pdf.
180. Id. at 1, 6.
181. Id. at 2.
182. See William K. Hallman, GM Foods in Hindsight, in EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES:
FROM HINDSIGHT TO FORESIGHT 13, 14 (Edna F. Einsiedel ed., 2008).

183.
184.

Id.
Pew Initiative, supra note 179, at 2.
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the battle over biotechnology has raged between experts, most of the
shots have passed over the heads of the non-combatants." 185
Because of the lack of awareness of biotechnology among most
consumers, public attitudes about the level of biotechnology regulation are difficult to isolate. 18 6 Among survey respondents who claimed
to be familiar with biotechnology regulation in the early to mid-2000s,
however, forty-one percent said there was too little regulation,
nineteen percent said the amount of regulation was about right, and
sixteen percent said there was too much.' 8 7 Mandatory regulation of
GM foods as a category, such as that contemplated by the proposed
Biotechnology Science Coordination Act of 1986188 ("H.R. 4452"),
might improve consumer confidence somewhat, though perhaps not
dramatically. In the Pew Initiative surveys, interviewers informed
survey respondents that "currently the Food and Drug Administration
('FDA') reviews data regarding the safety of genetically modified foods
that are voluntarily submitted by food companies."1 8 9 When asked
about their views if the FDA were mandated to regulate all GM foods
before they entered the market, forty-one percent said they would be
more willing to eat them, fourteen percent would be less willing, while
thirty-five percent said it would make no difference. 1 90
Confusion about the regulatory process itself is suggested by another survey result: on one hand, only fourteen percent of respondents
trusted "government regulators" for information about biotechnology,
ranking eighth out of eleven options.1 9 At the same time, twentynine percent said they trusted "the Food and Drug Administration, or
FDA" for such information, the fourth most selected option.192
B.

MOUNTING EVIDENCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND HEALTH IMPACTS
OF GMOs

Even though few Americans in the 2000s were aware of or discussing genetically modified organisms ("GMOs"), evidence has begun
to mount sustaining some of the concerns about the environmental
185. William K. Hallman & Jennifer Metcalfe, Public Perceptions of Agricultural
Biotechnology: A Survey of New Jersey Residents 36 (1994), available at http://agecon
search.umn.edulbitstream/18170/1/pa94haOl.pdf.
186. Cf Pew Initiative, supra note 179, at 6.
187. Id. at 5.
188. H.R. 4452, 99th Cong. (1986).
189. Pew Initiative, supra note 179, at 6.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 6-7.
192. Id. Topping the list were "friends and family" (37%), "farmers," (33%), and
"scientists and academics" (32%). At the bottom were "government regulators" (14%),
"food manufacturers" (14%), "biotechnology companies" (11%) and (ignominiously capitalized by the study authors), "The News Media" (9%). Id.
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and human health impacts of GMOs. This evidence directly challenges some of the assumptions upon which the regulatory framework
was based. In 1992 under the Bush (I) Administration, the Office of
Science and Technology Policy ("OSTP") based its Final Statement on
Scope on the conclusion of the National Research Council ("NRC") that
"crops modified by molecular and cellular methods [i.e., biotechnology]
should pose risks no different from those modified by classical methods for similar traits."' 9 3 Based on that conclusion and conclusions
that biotechnology was no different in any material way from traditional plant breeding,19 4 the OSTP's Final Statement on Scope announced a policy that products created through biotechnology would
not necessarily be subject to any different regulatory oversight than
organisms modified through traditional methods.' 98
Two decades after the publication of the Final Statement on
Scope, the conclusion that GMOs pose no unique risks has been increasingly called into question. While research is still ongoing, several significant environmental impacts related to herbicide-tolerant
crops have been identified. In the past decade, farmers have reported
the appearance of several herbicide-resistant weeds, a phenomenon
related to genetically-modified seeds.196 The weeds have developed
resistance to the herbicide glyphosate, an extremely popular and effective herbicide sold by Monsanto Corporation under the brand name
"Roundup."' 9 7 To enable farmers to spray Roundup on fields without
killing crops, Monsanto also sells corn, soybean, and cotton seeds that
have been genetically modified to tolerate Roundup.' 9 s Monsanto's
"Roundup-Ready" seeds were also heralded as an environmental advantage because they allowed farmers to plant without tilling the soil,
a method that controls weeds but also causes soil erosion and runoff of
soil, pesticides and herbicides.' 9 9
In the past decade, however, the easy combination of RoundupReady seed and Roundup herbicide has begun to backfire. In 2000,
193. 1992 Final Statement on Scope, supra note 35, at 6,755.
194. The Final Statement on Scope also cited the NRC's conclusions that "[t]he
same physical and biological laws govern the response of" GMOs and organisms modified by classical methods; "[i]nformation about the process used to produce a [genetically-modified] organism is .. . not a useful criterion" for determining whether a product
requires oversight; "no conceptual distinction exists" between GMOs and products modified by classical techniques; and "[iun many respects molecular methods resemble the
classical methods for modifying particular strains of microorganisms," but can be "even
more useful than the classical methods." Id.
195. Id. at 6,756.
196. See Neuman & Pollack, supra note 110, at B1; GMOs Breed 'Superweeds,'
Study Says, supra note 110, at 6.
197. Neuman & Pollack, supra note 110, at B1.
198. Id.
199. Id.
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the first Roundup-resistant weed appeared in a Delaware soybean
field. 2 00 Since then, ten resistant weed species in twenty-two states
have appeared, primarily in soybean, corn, and cotton fields. 20 1 The
appearance of glyphosate-resistant weeds has sent production agriculture scrambling to outdated herbicides and more labor-intensive strategies to control weeds. The president of the Arkansas Association of
Conservation Districts told The New York Times, "[Glyphosate-resistant weed growth] is the single largest threat to production agriculture that we have ever seen. "202 The chairman of the Georgia Cotton
Commission was quoted as saying, "If we don't whip this thing, it's
going to be like the boll weevil did to cotton. . . . It will take it

away."2 03
A spokesperson for Monsanto has stated the problem is "a serious
issue, but it's manageable." 20 4 The company acknowledged, however,
that it underestimated the pace of the herbicide-resistant weed
growth and failed to educate farmers about the need to diversify herbicide use to avoid resistance. 20 5 Monsanto, which has already lost substantial market share to Chinese-produced glyphosate, faces a further
economic threat as farmers who cannot rely on Roundup for weed control cease buying Roundup-Ready seed. 2 06
Other researchers have reported the discovery of GM plants crossing with non-modified strains of the plant in the wild. In 2010, researchers from several major U.S. universities and the EPA reported
that eighty-six percent of canola plants collected from alongside roadways in North Dakota tested positive for glyphosate resistance. 20 7
The authors stated that at least two of the samples tested positive for
multiple transgenic traits, which have not been released commercially. 20 8 According to one of the study's co-authors, "this finding suggests that feral populations are reproducing and have become
200. Id.
201. Id. The problem has been more extreme in the South, but by 2010 had spread
as far north as Missouri, home of the St. Louis-area-based Monsanto. See Georgina
Gustin, Roundup's Potency Slips, Foils Farmers;Resistant Weeds Are SpreadingNorth,
Adding Costs, Workload, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, July 25, 2010, at Al. One herbicide-

tolerant crop, pigweed, can grow up to three inches a day and reach heights of seven
feet, and is so hardy that it can damage harvesting equipment. Neuman & Pollack,
supra note 110, at Bl.
202. Neuman & Pollack, supra note 110, at Bl.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Gustin, supra note 201, at Al.
206. Id.
207. See Andrew Pollack, Canola,Pushed by Genetics, Moves Into Uncharted Territories, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 9, 2010, at D3; Brumfiel, supra note 110.
208. GM Canola Spread Widely Outside N.D. Farms: Study, CBC NEWS (Aug. 6,

2010), http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2010/08/06/gm-canola-wild-northdakota.html.
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established outside of cultivation." 2 0 9 Monsanto claimed that these
findings merely reflected the fact that ninety percent of canola crops
are now genetically modified. 2 10 While researchers generally agreed
that the GM canola plants were not likely to out-compete other wild
plants, 2 11 the findings raised concerns regarding the potential for "coexistence" of GM and non-GM varieties of the same plant. 2 12
Other researchers have recently begun to establish links between
GMO plants and harm to human and animal health. In one study,
researchers in Quebec, Canada, found that pregnant and non-pregnant women showed lingering effects of exposure to herbicides closely
related to GM plants. Further, the study found that the effects were
transferrable through the placenta to fetuses. 213 Monsanto has responded that "the authors do not report or allege adverse effects in
this paper-all of the women in this study were healthy and all of the
infants were normal."2 1 4
Other research has suggested a link between herbicide-tolerant
GM plants, increased use of herbicides, and animal or human health.
In 2009, French researchers reported that rats fed three different varieties of GM corn for three months showed significant disturbances in
liver and kidney function. 2 15 The rats were fed glyphosate-tolerant
(Roundup-Ready) maize and two varieties of maize engineered with
Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) toxins, a bacteria-derived insecticide. 2 16
The study authors concluded that "our data strongly suggests that
209. Id. (quoting Cynthia Sagers, associate professor of biological sciences at the
University of Arkansas).

210. See Pollack, supra note 19 at D3.
211. See Brumfiel, supra note 110.
212. See Pollack, supra note 19 at D3; Brumfiel, supra note 110.
213. See Aziz Aris & Samuel Leblanc, Maternal and Fetal Exposure to Pesticides
Associated to Genetically Modified Foods in Eastern Townships of Quebec, Canada,31
REPRODUCTIVE ToxicOLOGY 528, 532 (2011) (online ahead of press), available at http://

somloquesembrem.files.wordpress.com/2010/07/arisleblanc20ll.pdf. In the study, the
researchers tested both pregnant and non-pregnant women for the presence of glyphosate and gluphosinate, another common herbicide for which herbicide-tolerant GM seed
varieties have been developed. Id. at 529. The study reported that one metabolite of
the gluphosinate herbicide was detected in 100% of the maternal and umbilical cord
blood samples, and in 67% of the non-pregnant women's blood samples. Id. at 531 tbl.3.
Another metabolite of gluphosinate was detected in 93% of maternal blood samples,
80% of fetal blood samples, and 69% of non-pregnant women's blood samples. Id. at
532. The study noted that, while the human health dangers of GM seed themselves is

uncertain, health risks may come from increased exposure to herbicides associated with
GM foods. Id. at 1.
214. MONSANTO CO., MONSANTO VIEWPOINTS 1 (2011), available at http://www.mon
(last vissanto.com/newsviews/Documents/ArisLeBlanc-reproductive-toxicology.pdf
ited Mar. 14, 2012).
215. Joel Spiroux de Vend6mois et al., A Comparison of the Effects of Three GM
Corn Varieties on Mammalian Health, 5 INT'L J. BIOLOGICAL Sci. 706, 717 (2009).
216. Id. at 707.
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these GM maize varieties induce a state of hepatorenal toxicity." 2 1 7
The authors noted that the effects might be the result of the consumption of glyphosate and Bt toxin residues associated with the feed, 2 18
"although unintended metabolic effects due to mutagenic properties of
the GM transformation process cannot be excluded." 2 19
In January 2011, just before the USDA's decision to deregulate
Roundup-Ready alfalfa, a well-known plant pathologist sent a confidential letter to Department of Agriculture Secretary Vilsack, warning Vilsack of a newly discovered plant pathogen associated with the
overuse of glyphosate. 22 0 In the letter, which was leaked to the public, 22 1 Dr. Don Huber, professor emeritus at Purdue University, reported the discovery of a previously-unknown organism "that appears
to significantly impact the health of plants, animals, and probably
human beings."2 22 The organism, found in high concentrations in
Roundup-Ready soybeans and corn, had been confirmed in a wide variety of livestock that had experienced spontaneous abortions and infertility, and had also been linked to two pervasive plant diseases
driving down soy and corn crop yields. 2 23 In the letter, Huber explained the decision to inform the USDA of the danger before finalizing the research:
We are informing the USDA of our findings at this early
stage, specifically due to your pending decision regarding approval of [Roundup-Ready] alfalfa. Naturally, if either the
[Roundup-Ready] gene or Roundup itself is a promoter or cofactor of this pathogen, then such approval could be a calamity. Based on the current evidence, the only reasonable action at this time would be to delay deregulation at least until
sufficient data has exonerated the [Roundup-Ready] system,
if it does. 224
In the letter, Huber described the threat as "unique and of a high
risk status." 22 5 Huber requested access to the USDA data, urged a
217. Id. at 717.
218. Id. at 707, 717.
219.

Id. at 717.

220. Letter from Col. (Ret.) Don M. Huber, Emeritus Professor, Purdue Univ., to
Thomas Vilsack, Sec'y, USDA (Jan. 16, 2011) (on file with author), available at http://
farmandranchfreedom.org/letter-dr-huber-roundup-animal-miscarriage-infertility/.
221. See Letter from Col. (Ret.) Don M. Huber, Emeritus Professor, Purdue Univ., to
European Comm'n (Mar. 2011), available at http://farmandranchfreedom.org/letter-european-commision-dr-huber-gmo-roundup/.
222. Letter from Huber to Vilsack, supra note 220.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
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moratorium on deregulation of Roundup-Ready crops, and asked the
USDA to devote resources to additional research. 22 6
Monsanto has publicly dismissed the research. 2 27 In a letter on
its website responding to Huber's claims, Monsanto claimed that
"[i]ndependent field studies and lab tests by multiple U.S. universities
and by Monsanto prior to, and in response to, these allegations do not
corroborate [Huber's] claims." 228 Other scientists have also expressed
skepticism, particularly due to the lack of research offered in support
of the claims made in the letter. 2 29 The USDA acknowledged that it
received the letter from Huber, delivered by a third party. 23 0 A USDA
spokesperson was quoted as saying it did not investigate the matter
because "'we do not respond to third-party letters.'" 23 1 The USDA approved deregulation of Roundup-Ready alfalfa on January 27,
2011.232

C. GMO

REGULATION

REFORM ACTIVISM AND ITS IMPACTS

Since the late 1990s, some citizens have staged campaigns to
press for greater regulation of GMOs. Strategies have included public
protests, petitions to regulatory agencies, and lawsuits. In 1996, a
group called Mothers For Natural Law ("MFNL") launched a public
awareness campaign against GMOs, and in 1998 and 1999 received
500,000 signatures on a petition calling for labeling of GMO products. 2 3 3 MFNL has allied with the Organic Consumers Association
("OCA"), an organization formed in 1998 to "promot[e] the views and
interests of the nation's estimated 50 million organic and socially re226. Id.; see also Letter from Huber to European Comm'n, supra note 221 ("I feel I
would be totally irresponsible to ignore my own research and the vast amount of published research now available that support the concerns we are seeing in production
agriculture, without bringing it to the attention of the Secretary of Agriculture with a
request for him to initiate the much needed independent research.").
227. See P.J. Huffstutter, As Soybeans Die, A Theory Blooms; But Experts Pan Letter
Asserting Link Between Disease, Gene-Modified Crops, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Apr. 15, 2011,

at 21.
228. Statement About alleged Plant Pathogen PotentiallyAssociated with Roundup
Ready Crops, MONSANTO CO. (Feb. 22, 2011), http://www.monsanto.com/newsviews/
Pages/huber-pathogen-roundup-ready-crops.aspx.
229. See Huffstutter, supra note 227.
230. See Michael J. Crumb, Scientists Question Claims in Biotech Letter, LEWISTON
MORNING TRIBUNE (IDAHO), Apr. 4, 2011.

231. Id.
232. See Record of Decision, Glyphosate-Tolerant Alfalfa Events J101 and J163: Request for Nonregulated Status, Jan. 27, 2011, http://www.aphis.usda.gov/brs/aphisdocs/
04_11001p-rod.pdf.
233. For a good discussion of this campaign and other early anti-GMO activism efforts, see Emily Marden, Risk and Regulation: U.S. Regulatory Policy on Genetically
Modified Food and Agriculture, 44 B.C. L. Rev. 733, 753-54 (2003); see also MOTHERS
FOR NATURAL LAw, http://www.safe-food.org/ (website of Mothers for Natural Law).
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sponsible consumers." 2 34 0n its website, OCA calls for a "global moratorium on genetically engineered foods and crops."2 35 Organizations
that have actively campaigned for greater regulation of GMOs or genetically-engineered foods include the Center for Food Safety, a legal
and policy advocacy group;2 36 the Union of Concerned Scientists, an
alliance of scientists that produces technical reports and advocacy on
scientific matters of public interest; 2 37 and internationally-focused environmental interest groups such as Greenpeace. 238 In addition, the
Pew Charitable Trusts sponsored the Pew Initiative on Food and Biotechnology to spotlight policy issues and serve as a credible source of
information and ideas. 2 39
Like the MFNL petition, much anti-GMO activism has focused on
the issue of labeling of genetically-engineered foods. OCA currently
sponsors a grassroots initiative aimed at requiring such labeling. The
project, called "Millions Against Monsanto," organized a march from
New York to Washington, D.C. in October 2011.240 Marchers asked
passersby to send comments to the FDA through the "Just Label It"
campaign, another grassroots campaign sponsored by a variety of natural food organizations and businesses such as Organic Valley and
Stonyfield Farms. 24 ' The Just Label It campaign joined in a petition
to request that the agency require labeling of GMO foods. 2 42 The peti234.

See About the OCA: Who We Are and What We're Doing, ORGANIC CONSUMERS

ASSOCIATION, http://www.organicconsumers.org/aboutus.cfm (last visited Mar. 14,
2013).
235. Id.
236. The Center for Food Safety is a non-profit advocacy organization "working to
protect human health and the environment by curbing the use of harmful food production technologies by promoting organic and other forms of sustainable agriculture." See
About the Center for Food Safety, CENTER FOR FOOD SAFETY, http://www.centerforfood
safety.org/about-us (last visited Apr. 16, 2013). Strategies include legal actions, scientific and policy reports, educational materials, market pressure, and grassroots campaigns. Id.
237. See About Us, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTs, http://www.ucsusa.org/about/
(last visited Mar. 14, 2013).
238. See Sustainable Agriculture: No to GMOs, GREENPEACE, http://www.green

peace.org/usa/en/campaigns/genetic-engineering/ (last visited Mar. 14 2013).
239. See Agricultural Biotechnology, PEW CHARITABLE TR., http://www.pewtrusts.
org/ourwork detail.aspx?id=442 (last visited Mar. 21, 2013).
240. See Jenna Telesca, Natural Food Industry Brings Attention to GMOs, SUPERMARKET NEWS (Oct. 17, 2011), http://supermarketnews.com/speciality/natural-food-industry-brings-attention-gmos.
241. See id.; see also Partners,JUST LABEL IT!, http://justlabelit.org/partners/ (last
visited Mar. 14, 2013); Genetic Engineering in Agriculture, UNION CONCERNED SCIEN-

TISTS, http://www.ucsusa.org/food-and-agriculture/our-failing-food-system/genetic-engineering/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2013).
242. See CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY, CITIZEN PETITION BEFORE THE UNITED STATES FOOD
AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION (2011), availableat http://www.centerforfoodsafety.org/files/

ge-labeling-petition-10-11-2011-finall_21309.pdf; see also Record-Breaking One Million
Public Comments Demand FDA Label Genetically Engineered Foods, CENTER FOR FOOD
SAFETY, http-//www.centerforfoodsafety.org/issues/307/factory-farms/press-releases/700/
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tion to the FDA was filed by the aforementioned advocacy organization, the Center for Food Safety, in October 2011.243
Surveys indicate that consumers strongly support labeling. A
survey conducted for Just Label It in February 2012 indicated that
ninety-one percent of U.S. general election voters favored labeling
GMO foods, with eighty-one percent strongly supporting such measures. 2 44 Even after being read arguments for and against labeling,
eighty-nine percent continued to support labeling measures, with seventy-seven percent strongly in favor. 24 5
These results do not necessarily indicate a sharp increase in
awareness of GMOs, however, because the report does not indicate
what level of knowledge, if any, respondents had about GMOs before
completing the survey. Moreover, surveys indicating overwhelming
support for GMO labeling are called into question by the failure of
California's Proposition 37 in November 2012. The measure, which
would have made California the first state to require labeling of GM
foods, was defeated fifty-three percent to forty-seven percent. 2 46
Early surveys had indicated sixty percent support for the measure, 2 4 7
a substantial majority but considerably less than the ninety-one percent suggested by the Just Label It survey. Opponents of the measure
outspent supporters by five to one, with Monsanto, the largest producer of genetically-modified seeds, contributing $8.1 million to the
opposition campaign, nearly as much as the $9.2 million raised in total by supporters. 24 8
In the 2011 petition to the FDA filed by the Center for Food
Safety, petitioners urged the FDA to reconsider their 1992 policy
statement on labeling of genetically engineered foods. 24 9 In its 1992
Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties ("FDA Policy Statement"), FDA established the policy that genetically-engineered foods could be marketed without special labeling. 25 0 In the
record-breaking-one-million-public-comments-demand-fda-label-genetically-engineered-foods (last visited Mar. 14, 2013) [hereinafter Labeling Petition].
Labeling Petition,supra note 242.
See THE MELLMAN GROUP, INC., VOTES OVERWHELMINGLY SUPPORT A LABELING
REQUIREMENT FOR GE FOODS 1 (2012), available at http://justlabelit.org/wp-content/up
243.

244.

loads/2012/01/Mellman-Survey-Results.pdf.
245. Id. at 3.
246.

See Andrew Pollack, After the Loss, the Fight to Label Modified Food Continues,

N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2012, at B4.
247.
248.

Id.
Id.

249.

See CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY, supra note 242, at 2-3.

250. FDA - Statement of Policy, supra note 38, at 22,984. The FDCA provided that
foods shall be deemed misbranded if their labeling "fails to reveal facts . .. materialwith
respect to consequences which may result from the use of the article to which the labeling ... relates under the conditions of use prescribed in the labeling .. . or under such
conditions of use as are customary or usual." 21 U.S.C. § 321(n) (2012).
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FDA - Policy Statement, FDA stated that it had no information to
show that genetically-engineered foods "differ from other foods in any
meaningful or uniform way, or that, as a class, foods develop by the
new techniques present any different or greater safety concern than
foods developed by traditional plant breeding."2 5 1 The FDA interpreted section 201(n) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act 2 5 2
("FDCA") as not requiring labeling of genetically-engineered foods
without evidence of health risks or other "meaningful" changes in the
food product. 2 53
The FDA underscored the policy from the FDA - Policy Statement
in a 2001 statement of guidance for industry on voluntary labeling of
foods ("2001 Statement of Guidance"). In the 2001 Statement of Guidance, the FDA advised that voluntary labeling of a food that was not
bioengineered could itself be misleading if it "implies that the labeled
food is superior to foods that are not so labeled." 2 54 Emphasizing its
policy from the FDA - Policy Statement, the FDA supported this policy by noting that the FDA has "concluded that the use, or absence of
use, of bioengineering in the production of a food" or ingredient does
not, in and of itself, mean that there is a material difference in the
food. 2 55 Therefore, a label statement that expresses or implies that a
food is superior (e.g., safe or of higher quality) because it is not
bioengineered would be misleading. 256 The FDA gave no specific guidance as to what might be considered an implication of "higher quality," but only noted that it would consider the entire label to determine
whether a statement was misleading. 25 7
The Center for Food Safety's 2011 labeling petition urged the
FDA to treat genetically-engineered foods as misbranded under the
FDCA unless the foods contained a label with the words "GENETICALLY ENGINEERED." Petitioners argued that the lack of such label "fails to reveal facts . . . material" to consumers within the

meaning of the statute. The petition echoed arguments rejected by a
federal district court in 2001. In Alliance for Bio-Integrity v.
Shalala,25 8 plaintiffs challenged the FDA's 1992 decision not to re251. FDA - Statement of Policy, supra note 38, at 22,991.
252. Ch. 675, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as amended 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399f
(2012)).
253. FDA - Statement of Policy, supra note 38, at 22,991. It is important to realize
that section 201(n) of the FDCA translates to 21 U.S.C. § 321.
254. Draft Guidance for Industry: Voluntary Labeling Indicating Whether Foods
Have or Have Not Been Developed Using Bicengineering; Draft Guidance, 66 Fed. Reg.
4,839, 4,840 (2001).
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. 116 F. Supp. 2d 166 (D.D.C. 2001).
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quire labeling of GMOs. 25 9 Plaintiffs argued that the information was
"material" under the FDCA because consumers sought to rely on the
information in making purchasing decisions. 26 0 The district court
held that the question of materiality under the FDCA was a "factual
predicate to the requirement of labeling. Only once materiality has
been established may the FDA consider consumer opinion to determine whether a label is required to disclose a material fact."26 1 The
court deferred to the FDA's reading of Section 201(n) and its determination that changes from genetic modification were not "material" unless they led to "unique risks to consumer health or uniform changes
to food derived through rDNA technology." 2 62
More than a decade after Alliance for Bio-Integrity, the Center for
Food Safety's 2011 labeling petition renewed the argument about the
meaning of "material" in section 201(n) of the FDCA. First, the petition argued that, under section 201(n), the "material" standard is
merely exemplary, not exhaustive, of factors that may cause a label to
be false or misleading. 26 3 Failure to label products as genetically engineered is misleading, the petitioners argued, because recent scientific studies of GMOs reveal differences from foods not created
through genetic engineering.2 64 Further, the petition argued that consumers are misled by failure to label a product that lacks a proven
safety record differently from products whose safety has been proven
over many generations-an argument that would apply to all GMO
products and foods derived from them because of their relative novelty. 2 6 5 The petition pointed out that FDA uses a "voluntary consultation" process for new genetically engineered foods and does not
conduct safety testing. 26 6
259. See Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, 116 F. Supp. 2d 166, 171 (D.D.C.
2001).
260. Alliance for Bio-Integrity, 116 F. Supp. at 178.
261. Id. at 179.
262. Id. at 178-79.
263. See Labeling Petition, supra note 242, at 9-10 (citing the section 201(n)
requirement).
264. See Labeling Petition, supra note 242, at 10. For example, the petition noted
that the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in a 2010 case recognized
that record evidence demonstrated a compositional difference in milk from cows treated
with the genetically engineered hormone rbST, and milk from untreated cows, a finding
that contradicted FDA's position. Id. at 11 (citing Int'l Dairy Foods Ass'n v. Boggs, 622
F.3d 628, 636-37 (6th Cir. 2010)). The court in that case noted that the compositional
difference in milk from treated and non-treated cows need not be proven definitively; it
is sufficient, for purposes of labeling, that the absence of rBST in milk from untreated
cows can be demonstrated, while such absence cannot be verified in the milk of treated
cows. Int'l Dairy Foods Ass'n, 622 F.3d at 637.
265. Labeling Petition, supra note 242, at 10.
266. Id. at 11.
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Another argument offered in the petition for requiring mandatory
labeling is that consumer demand illustrates numerous non-organoleptic reasons why consumers may choose not to purchase geneticallymodified foods, such as potential health impacts, unknown risks, and
environmental impacts. 2 67 The petition noted that the FDA did consider consumer interest in such properties as a factor when it decided
to require labeling of irradiated foods. 26 8 The petition tacitly suggested that the court in Alliance for Bio-Integrity misconstrued this
argument by holding that consumer demand for information, by itself,
did not make information "material" under section 201(n) of the
FDCA. 2 6 9
The labeling campaign has been one of the most visible, but not
the only, grassroots effort for greater regulation of GMOs. For example, the Center for Food Safety has also been active in filing lawsuits
challenging the USDA's deregulation of certain GMO plants, including Roundup-Ready alfalfa, sugar beets, and freeze-tolerant eucalyptus. 2 7 0 This litigation strategy has met with some success: in the
alfalfa litigation, a U.S. district court ordered that the USDA had to
consider the impacts of GMO contamination of non-GMO crops as a
"significant effect on the human environment" under the National Environmental Policy Act 2 7 1 ("NEPA"). 2 72 Although the remedies portion of the decision was reversed and remanded by the United States
Supreme Court, the application of NEPA review to GMO deregulation
decisions was not appealed. 2 73
267.
268.
269.

Id. at 12.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 13.

270. See, e.g., Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Animal & Plant Health Inspection
Serv., No. 10-14175-CIV, 2011 WL 4737405 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 6, 2011) (providing an example of an unsuccessful challenge to an environmental assessment approving freeze-tolerant eucalyptus field tests); Complaint, Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack, No. CV11 1310
EDL (N.D. Calif. Mar. 18, 2011) (challenging deregulation of alfalfa after an environmental impact statement under the National Environmental Policy Act); Ctr.for Food
Safety v. Vilsack, No. C 08-00484 JSW, 2009 WL 3047227 (N.D. Calif. Sep. 21, 2009)
(providing an example of a successful challenge to deregulation of glyphosate-resistant
sugar beets based on an environmental assessment under the National Environmental
Policy Act); Geertson Seed Farms v. Johanns, No. C 06-01075 CRB, 2007 WL 518624
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2007) (providing an example of a successful challenge to deregulation
of glyphosate-resistant alfalfa after an environmental assessment); Int'l Ctr. for Tech.
Assessment v. Johanns, 472 F. Supp. 2d 8 (D. Mass. 2007) (challenging, with success,
the USDA's categorical exclusion from the National Environmental Policy Act analysis
of open-air field tests of glyphosate-resistant creeping bentgrass and Kentucky
bluegrass).
271. Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 4321-4347 (2012)).
272.

See Geertson Seed Farms, 2007 WL 518624, at *19.

273.

See Monsanto v. Geertson Seed Farms,_

U.S.

-,

130 S. Ct. 2743, 2749 (2010).
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The Union of Concerned Scientists ("UCS"), an alliance of citizens
and scientists that offers technical analysis and advocacy on a range of
scientific issues of public concern, has actively promoted a more precautionary approach to GMO development and regulation. 2 74 According to the UCS website, its official position on GMOs is that "the
technology has potential benefits, but we are critics of its commercial
application and regulation to date."2 75 UCS advocates, among other
measures, a more rigorous and conservative regulatory approach to
approval of GMO-based products, and support for food labeling laws.
Despite these efforts, most Americans, at least as of the mid2000s, had never had a conversation about biotechnology. 2 76 Even if
more recent activities succeeded where earlier efforts failed and
placed the issue within the public attention of the majority of Americans, public awareness and debate for most citizens on those issues is,
at best, nascent- more than a quarter-century after the creation of
the regulatory framework. If surveys showed that the majority of
Americans were aware of biotechnology, were in favor of its development, and were unconcerned about risk, GMO activists could fairly be
viewed as another vocal minority in a pluralist democracy. In an era
of rising public concern about the health and safety of America's food
system, however, the lack of impact of GMO grassroots activities on
overall public awareness of GMOs is notable. 27 7
D.

CONGRESSIONAL ACTION To REVISE PLANT BIOTECHNOLOGY
LEGISLATION

Grassroots efforts to encourage labeling of genetically-engineered
foods and other regulation of GMOs have not been mirrored by significant action in Congress to revise or even reconsider the 1980s regulatory framework. Since H.R. 4452 failed to unseat the 1986
274. Genetic Engineering in Agriculture, supra note 241.
275. Id.
276. See Hallman, supra note 176, at 29.
277. In the 2000s, public awareness of the food system was raised to unprecedented
levels through the success of mainstream books and movies. Michael Pollan's 2006 investigation of the modern food system, The Omnivore's Dilemma, reportedly sold more
than 250,000 copies in 2008 alone. See Wesley Longhofer et al., A Fresh Look at Sociology Bestsellers, AM. Soc. AsS'N: CONTEXTS, http://contexts.org/articles/spring-2010/afresh-look-at-sociology-bestsellers/ (last visited Apr. 16, 2013). By comparison, the topselling book written by a professional sociologist in 2008 sold 10,000 copies. Id. The
2009 movie Food Inc., a critique of corporate agriculture that focused extensively on
corporate ownership of plant biotechnology patents, grossed almost $4.5 million dollars
at the box office and ranked 31st among all-time top-grossing documentaries. See Food
Inc., NUMBERS: Box OFF. DATA, MOVIE STARS, IDLE SPECULATION, http://www.the-num-

bers.com/movies/2009/0FOIN.php (last visited Apr. 16, 2013); Genres: Documentary,

Box OFFICE MoJo, http://www.boxofficemojo.com/genres/chartlid=documentary.htm
(last visited Apr. 16, 2013).
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Coordinated Framework in the 1980s, Congress has taken relatively
little action to modify the legislative authority on which the established regulatory structure is based.
The one issue to receive some recent attention from Congress is
the issue of labeling of GMOs under the FDCA. On April 24, 2013, the
Genetically Engineered Food Right-to-Know Act ("GE Food Right-toKnow Act") was introduced in both the House and, for the first time
since 2000, in the Senate. 27 8 The bills, introduced by Senator Barbara
Boxer and Representative Pete DeFazio, were co-sponsored by nine
Senators and twenty-two Representatives. 2 79 Both the House and
Senate versions of the GE Food Right-to-Know Act begin with legislative findings that "the process of genetic engineering results in material changes to food derived from those organisms," and that the FDA
"requires the labeling of more than 3,000 ingredients, additives, and
processes." 28 0 The bills would amend the FDCA to provide that the
genetic engineering is a "material" fact that must be on food labels.
Senator Boxer and Representative DeFazio had written to FDA
Commissioner Margaret Hamburg in March 2012, joined by more
than fifty members of the House and Senate in support of the Center
for Food Safety's 2011 petition. 28 1 In the letter, the bicameral group
of legislators noted the poor fit between the FDCA, written long before
biotechnology was contemplated, and regulation of genetically-engineered food. The letter stated that the FDA's current interpretation of
the FDCA "uses 19th century concepts to regulate 2 1st century food
technologies." 28 2 The letter criticized the FDA's interpretation of the
"material" standard of section 201(n) in the FDCA as limited only to
278. See S. 809, 113th Cong., 159 CONG. REC. 2960 (2013), available at http://www.
centerforfoodsafety.org/files/labbill2013_26678.pdf (introducing S. 809 to require labeling of genetically engineered foods); H.R. 1699, 113th Cong.,159 CONG. REc. 2297
(2013), available at http://www.centerforfoodsafety.org/files/defazi_021_xml_34551.pdf
(introducing H. 1699 to require labeling of genetically engineered foods); see also Federal Legislation Introduced to Require the Labeling of Genetically Engineered Foods,
CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY (Apr. 24, 2013), http://www.centerforfoodsafety.org/press-re
leases/2116/federal-legislation-introduced-to-require-the-labeling-of-genetically-engi
neered-foods.
279. See S. 809; H.R. 1699.
280. See S. 809; H.R. 1699.
281. Letter from Barbra Boxer, U.S. Senator, and Peter Defazio, U.S. Congressman,
to Margaret Hamburg, Commisioner, FDA (Mar. 12, 2012) (on file with author), available at http://boxer.senate.gov/en/press/releases/031212.cfm. The letter was led by Senator Barbara Boxer and Representative Peter DeFazio. See Letter from Barbara Boxer,
U.S. Senator, Peter DeFazio, U.S. Congressman, Michael Taylor, Deputy Comm'r for
Food, FDA, to Margaret Hamburg, Comm'r, FDA (Feb. 2011) (on file with author),
available at http://www.nationalorganiccoalition.org/GMO/Final%20Boxer-DeFazio%20
GE%20Labeling%2OLetter%202%202%2012.pdf. The letter to Commissioner Hamburg
was joined by nine Senators and 44 Representatives. All signatories were Democrats.
282. Letter from Barbra Boxer and Peter Defazio to Margaret Hamburg, supra note
281.
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organoleptic properties, arguing that "novel food technologies" like genetic engineering on a commercial scale had "so far slipped underneath FDA's limited threshold for materiality" because molecular
changes cannot necessarily be detected by the senses. 2 83
The GE Food Right-to-Know Act, if passed, would undermine one
of the basic assumptions of the 1986 Coordinated Framework: that
GMO foods are no different than their conventional counterparts and
should not be regulated on the basis of the process used to create
them. 284 Previous versions of the bill, however, have received little
attention from the House or the Senate. The GE Food Right-to-Know
Act was first introduced in Congress by the most notable congressional opponent to the assumptions of the 1986 Coordinated Framework, Representative Dennis Kucinich of Ohio. For over a decade,
Representative Kucinich repeatedly introduced three bills that would
have altered the governing legislation. One bill, called the Genetically
Engineered Right to Know Act, 2 8 5 ("GE Right to Know Act") would
have amended the FDCA and two other statuteS28 6 to treat as misbranded any genetically-engineered food, unless the food label included the words "GENETICALLY ENGINEERED" and the
statement, "THIS PRODUCT CONTAINS A GENETICALLY ENGINEERED MATERIAL, OR WAS PRODUCED WITH A GENETICALLY ENGINEERED MATERIAL." 28 7 In its findings, the bill
addresses the controversy over FDA's interpretation of the term
"material":
The Congress finds as follows:
(1) The process of genetically engineering foods results in the
material change of such foods.
(2) The Congress has previously required that all foods bear
labels that reveal material facts to consumers.
(3) Federal agencies have failed to uphold Congressional intent by allowing genetically engineered foods to be marketed,
283. Id.
284. See 1986 Coordinated Framework, supra note 15, at 23,308 (noting no scientific
basis for regulating GMO products distinctly from other products); see also Final Statement on Scope, supra note 35, at 6,753 (focusing regulatory activity on characteristics of
product, not process used to create it).
285. See H.R. 3553, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R. 5577, 111th Cong. (2010); H.R. 6636,
110th Cong. (2008); H.R. 5269, 19th Cong. (2006); H.R. 2916, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R.
4814, 107th Cong. (2002); H.R. 3377, 106th Cong. (1999).
286. The other modified statutes are the Federal Meat Inspection Act, ch. 2907, 34
Stat. 1260 (1907) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 601-683 (2012)), and the Poultry
Products Inspection Act, Pub. L. No. 85-172, 71 Stat. 441 (1957) (codified as amended at
21 U.S.C. §§451-472 (2012)). To date, no genetically-engineered meat or poultry products have been approved for marketing.
287. H.R. 5577, 111th Cong. § 3 (2010).
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sold and otherwise used without labeling that reveals material facts to the public. 288
The GE Right to Know Act had fifty-eight co-sponsors when it was
introduced in 1999.289 The number of cosponsors dwindled to just
eleven in the 110th CongreSs29 0 and nineteen in the 111th Congress, 29 1 but rebounded to thirty-one after the bill was re-introduced
in the 112th Congress in 2011.292
Two other Kucinch-led bills, the Genetically Engineered Food
Safety Act ("GE Food Safety Act") and the Genetically Engineered
Technology Farmer Protection Act ("GE Technology Farmer Protection Act") were re-introduced frequently between 1999 and 2011.293
The first bill, the GE Food Safety Act, would have amended the FDCA
to require that the FDA treat genetically-engineered material in foods
as "food additives."2 94 The bill expressly rejected the presumption
previously announced by the FDA that genetically-engineered foods
would be presumed to be "generally recognized as safe" ("GRAS") and
therefore not subject to food additive review. 29 5 The second bill, the
GE Technology Farmer Protection Act, creates new legal protections
for farmers and workers related to biotechnology patents, such as
mandatory product disclosure requirements; 2 96 prohibitions on cer288. Id. at § 2.
289. See Bill Summary & Status: 106th Congress (1999-2000): H.R. 3377: Cosponsors, LIBR. CONGRESS THoiA.s, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d106:HRO3377:
@@@P.

290.

See Bill Summary & Status: 110th Congress (2007-2008): H.R. 6636: Cospon-

sors, LIaR. CONGRESS THOMAs, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?dllO:HRO6636:
@@@P.

291.

See Bill Summary & Status: 111th Congress (2009-2010): H.R. 5577: Cospon-

sors, LIaR.

@@@P.
292.

CONGRESS

THOmAS,

http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?dlll:hr5577:

See Bill Summary & Status: 112th Congress (2011-2012): H.R. 3553: Cospon-

sors, LIB.
@@@P.

CONGRESS THOmAS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d112:H1R03553:

293. See Genetically Engineered Safety Act, H.R. 3554, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R.
5578, 111th Cong. (2010); H.R. 6635, 110th Cong. (2008); H.R. 5268, 109th Cong. (2006);
H.R. 2917, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 4813, 107th Cong. (2002); H.R. 3883, 106th Cong.
(2000); Genetically Engineered Farmer Protection Act, H.R. 3555, 112th Cong. (2011);
H.R. 5579, 111th Cong. (2010); H.R. 6637, 110th Cong. (2008).
294. See H.R. 3554, 112th Cong. § 203.
295. See id. at § 202 ("Given the consensus among the scientific community that
genetic engineering can potentially introduce hazards, such as allergens or toxins, genetically engineered foods need to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis and cannot be
presumed to be generally recognized as safe."). In its 1992 statement of policy, the FDA
had announced that foods genetically engineered to contain "substance[s] . . . already
present at generally comparable or greater levels in currently consumed foods" would be
presumed to be GRAS. FDA - Statement of Policy, supra note 38, at 22,990. This presumption was more lenient than previous FDA policy for conventional food ingredients,
in which the burden remained on the manufacturer to show that any altered ingredient
remains GRAS. See Marden, note 234, at 748-49.
296. See H.R. 3554, 112th Cong. § 102.
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tain limitations in technology licenses, 2 9 7 protections against crosspollination of non-GMO crops; 2 98 and liability rules for injuries from
environmental releases. 29 9 The bill would also have amended the
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act 3 00 ("FIFRA") to
require the EPA to review and possibly limit the use of certain plantincorporated pesticides that may encourage pests to develop resistance to the pesticide.30 1
These bills would have substantially changed the legal controls on
GMOs, and revamped much of the legislative authority for the FDA,
the EPA, and the USDA regulation based on the 1986 Coordinated
Framework. The bills generated relatively little legislative momentum. The GE Technology Farmer Protection Act attracted no more
than eight cosponsors. 30 2 None of the bills was ever reported out of
committee. The only committee to hold hearings on the state of biotechnology regulation in the 2000s was the Domestic Policy Subcommittee of the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee, a
committee chaired by Kucinich. In July and September 2010, the Subcommittee held hearings on the effects of glyphosate-resistant plants
on production agriculture. 303 The subject of the hearings, "Are
'Superweeds' an Outgrowth of USDA Biotech Policy?", clearly focused
on the exercise of regulatory oversight under the existing regulatory
framework. Representative Kucinich, the chief congressional champion of stricter regulation of biotechnology, was defeated in the 2012
Ohio legislative primaries. 30 4
A congressional caucus intended to study and provide public information about biotechnology has been largely inactive and provided
little publicly-accessible information. A bipartisan group of Senators
and Representatives announced the creation of the Congressional Biotechnology Caucus in July 1991.305 The Caucus was "revived" nine
years later by a coalition of sixty-five members of Congress "dedicated
297. Id. at § 103.
298. Id. at § 105.
299. Id. at § 203.
300. Ch. 125, 61 Stat. 163 (1947) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y
(2012)).
301. H.R. 3555, 112th Cong. § 106.
302. See H.R. 3555, 111th Cong. (2011).
303. Are "Superweeds" an Outgrowth of USDA Biotech Policy?: Hearing on Before
the Subcomm. On Domestic Policy, H. Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform,
111th Cong. 158, 160 (2010).
304. See Paul Kane, Kucinich Loses to Colleague in Primary Vote for Redistricted
Ohio Seat, WASH. POST, Mar. 7, 2012, at A5. The article attributed Kucinich's loss to a
weak Democratic voter turnout in a "new Republican-drawn congressional map" and to
a cultural turn against colorful personalities in Congress. Id.
305. See "The Pink Sheet," CongressionalBiotech Caucus Will Look at Patent Law,
ELSEVIER Bus. INTELLIGENCE, http://www.elsevierbi.com/publications/the-pink-sheetl53/

028/congressional-biotech-caucus-will-look-at-patent-law

(last visited Apr. 16, 2013).
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to fostering a greater understanding of biotechnology issues."30 6 The
Caucus was listed in a fall 2012 congressional directory,3 0 7 but maintains no website nor currently publicizes other activities.3 0 8
E.

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS As PuBLIc CONSENT TO THE
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK

The presidential control model posits that Presidential elections
offer sufficient democratic process to legitimatize agency action. This
theory has been developed as a defense of the democratic legitimacy of
administrative action as a whole, and not of any one particular decision.3 0 9 Critics of the theory have challenged the assumption that
presidential elections can reasonably reflect majority will, because
most of the electorate knows little about specific agency actions and in
any event, voters could not express opinions on those myriad actions
through one vote with one alternative.3 1 0
The regulatory history of genetically modified organisms
("GMOs") confirms the notion that, at best, the presidential control
model can offer a justification for administrative action in general; it
would be difficult to argue that any of the seven presidential elections
since the 1986 Coordinated Framework represented a voter mandate
for or against biotechnology. Since most Americans still were not
aware of biotechnology in 2006, earlier elections could not have represented any majority opinion on the subject. And the pendulum swing
from pro-industry administrations (during which federal regulations
and policies were proposed) to a more environmentally precautionary
one (during which additional federal regulations and policies were
proposed) and then back, and then back once again, sends conflicted
messages about the validity of Presidential elections as indicators of
public attitude on the persistence of GMO regulatory policy.
306. See Dooley Announces Revival of Biotechnology Caucus, CAL DOOLEY (July 20,
2000), http://web.archive.org/web/20031224223203/http://www.dooley.house.gov/issues
2.cfm?id=1569.
307.

See Leadership Directories, 112th Congress, 2nd Session, CONGRESSIONAL YEL-

LOw BOOK, Fall 2012, at 992.
308. Inquiries to staff members listed in the directory about the activities of the
Caucus produced no additional information about Caucus activities. See e-mail from
John Goldberg, House Comm. on Agric., to Creg Ryan Hupp (Feb. 27, 2013) (on file with
author) (advising author's assistant to consult organization lists for most recent registration of Congressional Biotechnology Caucus). Inquiries to other staff members identified in the Congressional Yellow Book received no response.
309. See, e.g., Bressman, supra note 44, at 490-91 ("The presidential control model
seeks to ensure that administrative policy decisions reflect the preferences of the one
person who speaks for the entire nation. . . . [T]he result represents majority will. If it
does not, then the next election cycle, at least in theory, will ensure that it does.").
310. See Staszewski, supra note 46, at 867-69; Glen Staszewski, Reason-Givingand
Accountability, 93 MINN. L. REv. 1253, 1266-71 (2009).
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Perhaps the failure of GMO policy to become a major presidential
campaign issue in itself sends a message about democratic opinion.
Could decades of citizen passivity on the GMO issue indicate that the
public prefers to defer to federal regulators on issues of science that
most laypersons do not understand? While this conclusion is tempting, surveys on public attitudes about GMOs suggest the answer may
not be so simple. For example, in a 2005 survey on science governance
(including biotechnology), fifty-four percent of Americans were classified as "scientific elitists"-that is, they answered that decisions about
technology should be left to experts and should be based on scientific
evidence of risks and benefits.3 1 1 However, another forty-six percent
of Americans preferred that decisions about technology be made on a
different basis: twenty-two percent were classified as "moral elitists,"
meaning that they answered that decisions should be based on expert
opinions of moral and ethical issues, rather than science. 3 12 Another
fourteen percent were "moral democrats," who answered that decisions about technology should be made by average citizens based on
moral and ethical issues, and eleven percent were "scientific democrats," who believed that decisions should be made by average citizens
based on scientific evidence of risks and benefits.3 1 3
Moreover, trust in scientists does not always equate to trust in
federal regulators. When asked in a 1987 government survey whether
they would believe statements about the risk of a biotech product from
various groups, survey respondents were more inclined to believe university scientists, public health officials, and environmental groups
than federal agencies. 3 14 Similarly, respondents were asked to imagine a case in which a federal agency said a genetically altered organism did not pose a significant risk, but a national environmental group
said it did. 3 15 Respondents were far more likely to believe the environmental group (sixty-three percent) than the federal agency
(twenty-six percent). 3 16
This data suggests two things that cast doubt on the assumption
that public silence represents democratic approval for the 1986 Coor311. See George Gaskell et al., Social Values and the Governance of Science, 310
SCIENCE 1908 (2005); see also George Gaskell et al., Supporting Online Material, SciENCE, 2, 9 (Jan. 12, 2006) [hereinafter Supporting Online Material], http://www.science

mag.org/content/suppl/2006/01/12/310.5756.1908.DC1/Gaskell.SOM.REV.pdf.
312.

Gaskell et al., supra note 311; SupportingOnline Material, supra note 311, at

2, 9.
313. Id.
314. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, supra note 60, at 89-90. In the survey, 86% of
respondents said they were at least "inclined to believe" statements about risk from
university scientists, compared to 82% for public health officials, 71% percent for environmental groups, and 69% for federal agencies. Id. at 89-90.
315. Id. at 90.
316. Id.
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dinated Framework. First, a slight majority of Americans prefer that
decisions be made by scientific experts, but not necessarily by federal
regulators. Second, nearly half of Americans do not favor decisionmaking by scientific experts at all, but prefer that decisions about new
technology be based on expert or public citizen opinions about moral
and ethical values related to that technology, or by public opinion
about scientific risks and benefits.3 1 7
VI. DID THE CREATION OF THE 1986 COORDINATED
FRAMEWORK HAVE A CHILLING EFFECT ON
DEMOCRATIC DELIBERATION?
For a quarter-century, the 1986 Coordinated Framework has
guided the creation of a regulatory framework for legal controls on
biotechnology that continues today. These regulations, based on authority under statutes written before the technology was imagined,
were implemented at the same time as a brief early period of congressional interest in the topic. This congressional interest has not been
approached since. The executive branch interpreted the scope of its
regulatory authority and argued against Congress creating new oversight legislation. Federal agencies elaborated policies through policy
statements and guidance documents that determined what information the public would receive about the new technology. In some
cases, these policy statements were not subject to notice and comment
but were still granted deference by courts. While a vocal group of citizens has challenged biotech regulatory policy since the late 1990s,
those challenges have not translated into legislative change to the federal agencies' statutory authority, substantial reinterpretation of that
authority by the agencies themselves, or strong familiarity with biotechnology by the average American.
Did the creation of a regulatory scheme under existing statutes
interfere with public debate over the legal controls for biotechnology?
Did the pre-emptive strike by the Executive branch undermine congressional attempts to develop momentum to pass new legislation specific to the technology? Did the quick regulatory solution, allowing the
new products to come to market, deflect public attention away from
the debate? Before commercialization was a fact of economic life, did
the public have a meaningful opportunity to understand the new technology, to engage in democratic deliberation about whether and how
to control the technology, and to discuss whether such controls should
be based on existing statutes or new ones?
317. See Gaskell et al., supra note 311; Supporting Online Material, supra note 311,
at 2, 9.

704

CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

No retrospective case study can prove what might have been.
Still, the history of biotechnology development and public awareness
of that technology raises doubts as to whether the public has had an
opportunity to engage in meaningful democratic deliberation about biotech controls. As of 2006, most Americans had never had a conversation about biotechnology. 3 18 Congressional leaders abandoned the
effort by 1990 because of the existence, by that time, of the 1986 Coordinated Framework.3 1 9 Even as studies have begun to document serious harms to the environment and potential harms to human health
related to the widespread planting of herbicide-resistant biotech
crops,3 20 Congress has taken little action to review the regulatory
structure, and the chief proponent of such oversight in the House was
defeated in the 2012 primaries. 3 2 1 Surveys do not support an inference that the public is simply content to defer to regulators on controls
of new technology. Nearly half of Americans do not believe such decisions should be made by scientific elites at all, and more Americans
said they would trust university scientists, public health officials, and
environmental groups than federal regulators. 3 2 2
What might have happened if federal agencies did not have the
institutional advantage of being able to move much more quickly than
legislatures? Once the most involved actors-industry and regulators-were satisfied that biotechnology products would be brought to
market and a framework existed for the exercise of regulatory authority, the impetus for public attention and deliberation to the new technology could only have been weakened. Not until over a decade later,
in the late 1990s, did any significant grassroots concern over GMO
controls begin. And a number of years of such grassroots organizing
still failed to bring the issue to the attention of most Americans.
The creation of the GMO regulatory structure is water under the
bridge. Substantial changes in the legislative authority of federal
agencies to regulate GMOs will depend on further grassroots activism,
strong new proponents in Congress, and, in all likelihood, growing evidence of environmental and human health harms. Unfortunately, it
may also require a crisis of even greater magnitude than the widespread crop losses attributable in recent years to glyphosate-resistant
weeds. 3 23 As early as 1987, then-Senator Al Gore lamented,
In Congress, each proposal designed to bring regulatory order
to biotechnology has met vigorous opposition from the indus318. See supra notes 175-185 and accompanying text.
319.
320.

See supra notes 22-39 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 193-232 and accompanying text.

321. See supra notes 245-248, 281-308 and accompanying text.
322. See supra notes 60-80 and accompanying text.
323. See supra notes 194-232 and accompanying text.
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try and the Administration. Without a crisis to focus attention on biotechnology, it is difficult to argue for making
regulatory reform in this area a priority, especially when
compared to the needs to reform other major environmental
laws such as Superfund and the Clean Air Act. 324
But this history of legislative and regulatory dynamics in the
GMO context offers a pertinent lesson for technologies emerging for
commercial use today. The Clean Air Act itself is now the focus of a
tug-of-war between the Obama Administration, Congress, and the federal courts over the scope of executive power to regulate greenhouse
gas emissions under that legislation, written decades before climate
change was a national policy issue. A similar debate has surged over
the Obama Administration and the EPA's use of regulatory authority
under the Clean Water Act to regulate hydraulic fracturing of unconventional gas shales.
In this current round of expansive regulatory interpretation of
statutes that pre-dated controversial new technologies and scientific
developments, the ideological battle lines are reversed. Instead of a
pro-industry administration eager to facilitate products coming to
market, the charge is being led by a pro-conservation administration
eager to institute precautionary measures to prevent major environmental harms. Judgments about the democratic legitimacy of the current regulatory effort, however, should not be clouded by one's opinion
of the ideologies or priorities of the acting administration. If the GMO
case study raises concerns about executive action that precedes, and
possibly preempts, public deliberation about newly-emerging science
or technology, those concerns should apply all such agency action, regardless of the ideological appeal of the short-term goal such action
serves. If the result seems to be an unsatisfying compromise of urgent
protections to facilitate long-term engagement, then perhaps new
mechanisms for balancing legislative power and agency authority in
the short term should be explored.

324.
(1987).

Al Gore, Planninga New Biotechnology Policy, 5 HARv. J.L. &

TECH.

19, 26-27
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